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Abstract
This dissertation investigates how young workers’ abilities shape their early
careers in the presence of information frictions and labor market shocks through two
studies. The research in the first chapter focuses on the strength of a worker’s com-
parative advantage, which measures the distribution of her abilities. Workers are
uncertain about what they are good at when they enter the labor market, and then
they shop around to find their best-matched occupations. I use the average distance
between productivities in the best-matched occupation and the other occupations
to measure the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage. Empirically, those
productivities are estimated from a multinomial logit regression of a worker’s choice
of her best-matched occupations. A worker with a larger productivity distance has
a stronger comparative advantage. The empirical results suggest that this worker
spends fewer years shopping occupations and tries fewer occupations before finding
her best-matched one. To further quantify the importance of strength in occupational
shopping, I build a learning model in which a worker determines her comparative ad-
vantage by observing the output at the current occupation. The quantitative model
suggests that enlarging the productivity distance by one standard deviation in the
model reduces more than 80% of occupational changes in the first ten years of ca-
reers. Moreover, for an average labor market entrant, the value of learning about her
comparative advantage is 28% of her expected lifetime earning.
ii
The study in the second chapter focuses on how Conscientiousness, a personal-
ity trait, helps workers mitigate the adverse effects of graduating during a recession on
early career outcomes. By analyzing college graduates who graduated in the 1980s, I
find that Conscientiousness reduces the income losses of workers who graduate during
a recession. More specifically, those whose Conscientiousness scores are in the upper
quartile are sheltered from the losses. The mitigation effect primarily results from
workers’ adjustments in their labor supply. Workers high in Conscientiousness tend
to work more weeks, try harder to find full-time jobs, and work more hours in these
full-time jobs in response to the adverse labor market entry conditions. However, this
study does not find any mitigation effects for cognitive ability.
iii
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Chapter 1
Occupational Shopping of Youth:
The Strength of a Worker’s
Comparative Advantage
1.1 Introduction
This study explores how the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage
influences her occupational choices and the path to her best-matched occupation in
her early career. Occupational choice plays a significant role in the wage growth of
young workers, with a mismatch between workers and occupations depressing the
wage growth not only in the current occupation but also in future ones (Guvenen
et al., 2020; Addison, Chen and Ozturk, 2019).
A worker is uncertain about her most appropriate occupation when she enters
the labor market. She learns it while at work and changes occupations as she dis-
covers ones more suitable. Previous literature has found that this learning process is
one key element driving occupational changes (Johnson, 1978; Antonovics and Golan,
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2012; Papageorgiou, 2014; Gorry, Gorry and Trachter, 2019). Based on the previous
research, this paper proposes that a worker who has a stronger comparative advan-
tage is easier to find her best-matched occupation because she needs less information
to discover the best-matched one. This study uses the average distance between the
productivity in a worker’s best-matched occupation and the productivity in her other
occupations to measure the strength of her comparative advantage. For this measure-
ment, a shorter average distance indicates an more even productivity distribution and
a weaker comparative advantage.
Using a subsample of high school graduates from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), this study finds that a young worker who has a
stronger comparative advantage takes a shorter time and tries fewer occupations
before she finds the one best suited for her. The productivity used to measure the
strength of the comparative advantage defined above is unobserved in the data. This
study estimates it using a multinomial logit regression of the final occupational choice
at the end of the first ten years. In this estimation, I assume that workers complete
the occupational learning process after ten years of working experience and are in
their best-matched occupations at that time. My quantitative model is consistent
with this assumption, suggesting that approximately 90% of workers find the ones
best suited for them at the end of the first ten years.
To further quantify the importance of the strength of a worker’s compara-
tive advantage and the value of learning her most appropriate occupation, I build a
learning model of occupational choices with heterogeneous occupation-specific pro-
ductivity. My model builds on the canonical job shopping model of Johnson (1978),
extending his framework to a dynamic model with three occupations. Following Papa-
georgiou (2014), I assume that workers have three occupation-specific productivities
instead of one general ability as assumed by Johnson (1978). The productivity of
2
each occupation is drawn from a separate normal distribution. A worker does not
know her productivities at labor market entry and chooses an occupation to work in
each period to maximize her expected lifetime income. The worker only learns about
her productivity in the current occupation by observing her noisy output. The policy
function of my model is given by the Gittins Index, which characterizes the total value
of wage and learning. A worker’s optimal choice is to work in the occupation with the
highest Gittins Index in each period (Gittins, 1979). For a worker with evenly dis-
tributed occupation-specific productivities, a small change in the current occupation’s
Gittins Index caused by learning, is likely to make the current occupation suboptimal
in the next period, thus leading to an occupational change.
In this study, the model is calibrated by matching moments of wages and occu-
pational changes during the first two years of careers. The simulated model developed
here is consistent with the patterns of occupational changes in the first ten years in
the data, including the declining probability of occupational switches, asymmetric
occupational transition matrix, and return mobility. The model also replicates the
effects of the productivity distance on the path to a worker’s best-matched occupation
in the data. Workers in the model with shorter distances between occupation-specific
productivities also take longer and try more occupations before moving to their best-
matched occupations than their counterparts with longer distances.
The model quantifies the importance of heterogeneous occupation-specific pro-
ductivity for occupational changes of young workers. In a counterfactual exercise, I
increase the distance between productivities by one standard deviation. The compar-
ison between the experimental and the calibrated models reveals that the increase in
the distance reduces more than 80% of simulated occupational changes in the first
ten years. My model also quantifies the value a worker ascribes to learning her appro-
priate occupation. The value placed on this learning is 28% of the expected lifetime
3
earnings for an average labor market entrant and decreases to 4% for an average
worker with ten years of labor market experience.
This paper is the first to study the interaction between the strength of com-
parative advantage and the learning process and to document the effects of strength
on occupational changes. It contributes to the literature on how a worker’s learning
drives occupational transitions.1 Johnson (1978) began the research in this area by
exploring the effects of learning on job choice for workers who are uncertain about
their general ability. He finds that young workers trade the current wage for an extra
amount of learning and choose riskier jobs initially. Recent papers have extended
this research by exploring various abilities that workers learn about (Antonovics and
Golan, 2012; Papageorgiou, 2014; Groes, Kircher and Manovskii, 2015; Gorry, Gorry
and Trachter, 2019). In addition to their abilities, workers could also learn their match
qualities, a factor driving job or occupational changes as well (Jovanovic, 1979; Miller,
1984; McCall, 1990; Neal, 1999).
This research is most closely related to Papageorgiou (2014). Following his pa-
per, workers in my model have multi-dimensional abilities and learn their comparative
advantages over time. However, I abstract from the correlations between occupation-
specific productivities and search frictions to emphasize the effects of the productivity
distribution. Another closely related study is the one conducted by Gorry, Gorry and
Trachter (2019), who explore the occupational changes of high school graduates in
the NLSY79, a research question similar to this study. However, the two studies
have different focuses: This current study focuses on the effects of the strength of
a worker’s comparative advantage on her occupational changes, while the previous
work focuses on the effects of initial beliefs on future occupational changes.
1One could also study the effects of learning from a firm’s perspective. For example, see Farber
and Gibbons (1996); Altonji and Pierret (2001); Lange (2007) and Kahn (2013).
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This study also adds to the broad literature on life-cycle wage growth and
the dynamics of job change. Learning and the accumulation of heterogeneous hu-
man capital are two primary forces driving job change and wage growth (see Rubin-
stein and Weiss (2006) and Sanders and Taber (2012) for comprehensive reviews).
Sanders (2010) compares the effects of learning and human capital accumulation on
both job mobility and wage growth, finding that learning plays a primary role in job
mobility but a minor role in wage growth. In line with his finding, this paper focuses
on the effects of learning on occupational change.
1.2 Data Overview
1.2.1 Data Set
This study uses a subsample of high school graduates from the cross-sectional
sample of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), which follows
the lives of American youth born between 1957 and 1964. It is a rich data set
measuring workers’ abilities and tracking their career outcomes, features making it
an excellent source for studying the effects of a worker’s ability distribution on her
occupational transitions. The survey, begun in 1979, was conducted annually until
1994 and biennially thereafter. In this paper, I use annual job observations between
1979 and 1994 when annual observations are available.2
Table 1.1 describes the sample construction process. The final sample contains
1,151 individuals and 11,770 annual job observations. Individuals in my sample re-
ceived a high school diploma or a General Educational Development certificate (GED)
as their highest degree when they were 17–19 years old. This study restricts job ob-
2Annual job observations are current or most recent jobs as of the interview date. The NLSY79
define them as CPS jobs.
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servations to those in the first ten years of a career because occupational shopping is
more prominent in these early years. For this study, a worker’s career begins when
she starts to work consecutively for two years. Workers who have their final degree
before 1978 were excluded because the years when they start their careers are not
available in the data. I also drop workers who did not start their careers in the two
years after graduation so that workers in my sample have relatively homogeneous
knowledge about occupations. Finally, to be included in this study, workers need to
have had at least seven valid job observations in their first ten years so that they were
firmly attached to the labor market.3
1.2.2 Three Broad Occupations
This study groups jobs into three broad occupations: white-collar, pink-collar,
and blue-collar occupations as was done in Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Papageorgiou
(2014). Table 1.2 reports the corresponding 3-digit 1970 occupational codes for three
occupations. White-collar workers includes managers, administrators, professionals,
and technicians, while pink-collar workers are sales personnel, clerks, and service
workers, and blue-collar workers include mechanics, operators, drivers, laborers, and
farmers.
An occupational change is defined here as a change among the three broad
occupations. As Neal (1999) argues, occupational codes in the NLSY79 contain errors,
which may cause false identifications of occupational changes. To address this issue,
I follow Guvenen et al. (2020)’s strategy of assigning the occupation that is most
often observed in a job spell to that job, an approach that assumes that workers do
not change broad occupations within a job spell. Using this strategy, I modify fewer
3Workers have at most 11 annual job observations in the first ten years because they begin with
zero years of experience. A valid annual job observation requires a hourly wage between one and
one thousand real dollars based 2014 monetary value and information about its occupation.
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than 9% of annual job observations for their broad occupations.4 In the final sample,
43.5% of jobs are blue collars, 46.5% pink collars and 10.0% white collars.5
1.2.3 Overall Patterns
High school graduates shop for occupations frequently when they are young.
On average, 11.95% of high school graduates in my sample switch between the three
occupations each year during the first ten years of their careers. This result is in line
with the occupational mobility of young workers found by Papageorgiou (2014), who
reports that 11% to 14% of white male high school graduates between 18 to 20 switch
between three broad occupations in eight months.6 Figure 1.1 plots the proportion
of workers in my sample who change occupations each year after labor market entry.
When workers enter the labor market, they are uncertain about their productivities
across occupations and, thus, update their beliefs of productivities rapidly. According
to Figure 1.1, 17.55% of workers change occupations in the first year. As workers try
various occupations, they gain the knowledge about their occupation-specific abilities.
As a result, experienced workers are less likely to revise their beliefs so much that
they change occupations. Ten years after labor market entry, only 8.29% of workers
change occupations in a year.
However, despite the prevalence of occupational shopping, young workers do
not change occupations permanently. After trying different occupations, they may
4Table 14 lists ten three-digit occupations where most of the modifications occur. Among them,
managers and administrators (n.e.c.) has the most modifications. n.e.c. means “not elsewhere clas-
sified.” As the occupation title indicates, it is likely to be coded incorrectly.
5Table 15 compares the number of observations in three broad occupations before and after the
modification. There are two percentage points fewer of annual job observations in white-collar occu-
pations after the modification, potentially because young workers tend to misreport their occupations
as white-collar occupations.
6Papageorgiou (2014) uses different occupational groups from this paper for his sample of white
male high school graduates. His three groups are white-collar occupations, blue-collar occupations
involving precision production and repairs, and blue-collar occupations involving operators and
laborers.
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return to prior ones. Table 1.3 reports the proportion of workers who change occu-
pations in a specific year and then return to the ones which they just left within a
certain period. On average, more than one-third of workers return to prior occupa-
tions within three years after the initial change. The probability of return, however,
declines sharply the more time after the initial change. The longer a worker stays
in other occupations, the lower the probability is that she returns to the previous
occupation. In the first year after the initial change, 17.28% of workers return, while
in the second year 10.90% of workers return, and in the third year, only 7.30% of
workers return. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) find similar patterns but slightly
lower return mobility for prime-age male workers.
Although on average young workers shop for occupations frequently, not all of
them change occupations often in their early careers. Table 1.4 reports the proportion
of workers with different occupational mobility in the first ten years of their careers
as well as the average number of years that workers spend in the labor market before
they move to their last occupations. As this table shows, 46.05% of young workers
never change occupations in the first ten years, while 14.94% of young workers change
occupations at least three times. The latter exhibit every high occupational mobility
as there are only three broad occupations in my analysis. Consistent with their
high occupational mobility, on average they spend 7.83 years to move into their last
occupations in the first ten years of their careers.
1.3 A Learning Model of Occupational Choices
Motivated by the overall patterns of occupational shopping presented in Sec-
tion 1.2.3, I develop a learning model of occupational choices, in which workers learn
their occupation-specific productivities and make occupational choices based on the
8
beliefs of their comparative advantages. This model provides new insights into how
a worker’s productivity distribution affects her occupational changes.
1.3.1 Preference and Production
An infinitely lived risk-neutral worker i maximizes the present value of her
lifetime wage, which is presented by
∞∑
t=0
βtwit. (1.1)
The economy includes the blue, pink and white collar occupations, and there are no
search frictions. Each period, worker i makes an occupational choice. If she works in
occupation j at time t, her output is
xijt = aij + zijt, (1.2)
where aij is the worker i’s innate productivity (ability) in occupation j, and zijt is the
noise in the output process in occupation j at time t. Productivities are occupation-
specific in my model.7 Workers do not accumulate occupation-specific human capital
at work.8 The productivity aij for occupation j, which is fixed over a worker’s career,
is drawn independently from a normal distribution N(kj, θj) at birth. The vector of
a worker’s productivities in the three occupations defines her comparative advantage.
7My model does not incorporate general human capital for the simplicity. However, including it
does not affect the implications of my model as long as it has equal productivities across occupations
at any given time and is public information. See papers by Antonovics and Golan (2012) and Groes,
Kircher and Manovskii (2015) for examples of learning models with occupation-specific returns to
general human capital.
8Sanders (2010) finds that skill accumulation plays a minor role in occupational transitions com-
pared to learning about abilities. For this reason, I abstract from the accumulation of occupation-
specific human capital in my model. This simplification helps the model highlight the interaction
between productivity distance, learning and occupational transitions.
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The random component of the output zijt follows an occupation-specific normal dis-
tribution N(0, σj), and the parameter σj measures the risk of an occupation, with a
high value of σj indicating that the occupation is risky in the sense that a worker’s
output in that occupation exhibits large fluctuations over time.
1.3.2 Learning
Although a worker knows the distributions of output noises in the three occu-
pations, she has limited knowledge about her occupation-specific productivities when
she enters the labor market. Following Gorry, Gorry and Trachter (2019), I assume
that a worker’s prior knowledge is equivalent to the observation of α periods of output
in each occupation.9 Worker i’s belief of her productivity in occupation j at labor
market entry has the normal distribution
P0(aij) ∼ N(x¯ij0,
σ2j
α
), (1.3)
where x¯ij0 is the mean of α periods of worker i’s prior output in occupation j at labor
market entry (t = 0), and
σ2j
α
measures the precision of worker i’s belief about her
productivity in occupation j at the entry. The precision increases as
σ2j
α
decreases.
A worker exhibits lower precision concerning her belief about her productivity in a
risky occupation than in a safe occupation. It should be noted that in this model
each worker has the same amount of knowledge for a given occupation in the model.
After a worker enters the labor market, she learns about her productivity in
her current occupation by observing the corresponding output at the end of each
period. Given the normality of the belief at the entry and the noise in the output
9I assume that workers have an improper uniform prior at birth. It and the normal distributed
noise ensure that the belief always has a normal distribution.
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process, the prior belief for worker i in occupation j at time t is distributed normally
as
Pt(aij) ∼ N(µijt, τ 2ijt), (1.4)
where µijt = x¯ijt and τ
2
ijt =
σ2j
Tijt
. x¯ijt is the mean of worker i’s prior output in
occupation j before time t, and Tijt is worker i’s accumulated tenure in occupation j
before time t. Both x¯ijt and Tijt include α periods of equivalent output prior to labor
market entry.
If worker i chooses occupation j at time t, then in the next period, the ac-
cumulated occupational tenure in occupation j increases by one period, represented
by
Tijt+1 = Tijt + 1, (1.5)
and the accumulated tenure in the other two occupations does not change, represented
by
Tij′t+1 = Tij′t. (1.6)
After worker i observes the output xijt, she updates the mean of her belief in occu-
pation j as
µijt+1 =
τ 2ijt
τ 2ijt + σ
2
j
xijt +
σ2j
τ 2ijt + σ
2
j
µijt
=
σ2j/Tijt
σ2j/Tijt + σ
2
j
xijt +
σ2j
σ2j/Tijt + σ
2
j
x¯ijt
=
xijt + x¯ijt × Tijt
Tijt + 1
=
xijt + x¯ijt × Tijt
Tijt+1
= x¯ijt+1,
(1.7)
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and updates the variance of her belief as
τ 2ijt+1 = (
1
τ 2ijt
+
1
σ2j
)
−1
= (
1
σ2j/Tijt
+
1
σ2j
)
−1
=
σ2j
Tijt + 1
=
σ2j
Tijt+1
.
(1.8)
Worker i’s beliefs about her productivities in the other two occupations do not change
at time t because she does not observe her output in occupations where she has not
worked.
1.3.3 Wages
Firms are risk-neutral, have zero costs of entry, offer jobs in all occupations,
and share the same information as workers. In this environment, any wage policy
which provides the expected wage equal to the expected output is consistent with the
equilibrium in Jovanovic (1979). I assume that wages in my model satisfy
wijt = 0.5x¯ijt + 0.5xijt. (1.9)
Firms and workers share the uncertainty in the output process according to my
wage contract.10 This share of uncertainty does not change workers’ learning process
and, thus, their occupational transitions. The assumption that workers and firms are
risk-neutral assures that only expected values matter in the decision process.
10There are other ways to assign uncertainty in the literature. For example, workers bear all the
uncertainty if firms pay workers their realized output. Another extreme case is that firms bear all
the uncertainty if firms pay workers their expected output. Groes, Kircher and Manovskii (2015) use
both approaches in their paper. Here, I take the middle ground. The later calibration result shows
that my wage contract is consistent with the data.
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1.3.4 The Value Function
In this study, x¯it,Tit are state variables for worker i at time t. x¯it is the
vector of means of prior output in the three occupations, and Tit is the vector of
accumulated occupational tenure in the three occupations before time t. V (x¯it,Tit)
is the value function, which satisfies
V (x¯it,Tit) = max
{
v1(x¯it,Tit), v2(x¯it,Tit), v3(x¯it,Tit)
}
, (1.10)
where vj(x¯it,Tit) is the value function of working in occupation j at time t, which is
represented as
vj(x¯it,Tit) = E
(
wijt |Pt(aij)
)
+ βE
(
V (x¯it+1,Tit+1) |Pt(aij)
)
. (1.11)
The first element on the right in Equation 1.11 is the expected wage that worker i
earns if she currently works in occupation j. It equals the expected output E(xijt).
The second half is the discounted expected value at the next period if worker i chooses
occupation j at time t.
For a worker whose prior belief is Pt(aij), according to the Bayes rule, her
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perceived probability density of producing xijt in the current period is
f(xijt|P (aij |t))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(xijt|aij)× gt(aij)daij
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(2piσ2j )
−1/2
exp
[
− 1
2
(xijt − aij
σj
)2]× (2piτ2ijt)−1/2 exp [− 12(µijt − aijτijt )2
]
daij
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(2piσ2j )
−1/2
exp
[
− 1
2
(
xijt − aij
σj
)
2]
× (2pi σ2j
Tijt
)−1/2
exp
[
− 1
2
(µijt − aij
σj/Tijt
)2]
daij
=
(
2pi
σ2jTijt
Tijt+1
)−1/2
exp
[
− 1
2
( xijt − x¯ijt
σj
√
Tijt/Tijt+1
)2]
= φ
(
xijt
∣∣ x¯ijt, σ2jTijt
Tijt+1
)
,
(1.12)
where gt(aij) is the p.d.f. of Pt(aij), and φ(·) represents a normal density. Knowing
that the perceived probability density follows a normal distribution with mean x¯ijt
and variance σ2jTijt/Tijt+1, we write Equation 1.11 as
vj(x¯it,Tit) = x¯ijt + β
∫ ∞
−∞
V (x¯it+1,Tit+1)φ
(
xijt
∣∣ x¯ijt, σ2jTijt
Tijt+1
)
dxijt. (1.13)
Theoretically, the dynamic problem defined by Equation 1.10 and Equation 1.13
could be solved using value function iterations. However, it becomes computationally
burdensome as my model has three occupations and six state variables.
1.3.5 The Optimal Policy
In the model, a worker’s beliefs concerning her productivities in the three
occupations evolve independently and only when she works in the corresponding
occupation. The optimal occupational choice here is a multi-armed bandit problem.
Gittins (1979) proposes a method using indices to find an optimal policy. By assigning
Gittins Indices to each occupation at different states, the optimal policy is always to
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choose the occupation with the highest index.
Gittins Indices transform the three-dimensional dynamic problem defined by
Equation 1.10 and Equation 1.13 into three one-dimensional problems. Instead of
considering the state spaces of three occupations, the Gittins Index of an occupation
only depends on its state. Gittins Indices dramatically reduce the computational
expnese and potentially allow my model to incorporate more than three occupations.11
Gittins Indices are computed using an outside option with a constant reward
to evaluate a complicated bandit process, which, in my model, is whether to work in
occupation j. Suppose an infinitely lived worker i faces two choices in each period: one
is to work in occupation j with expected wage E(wijt) = x¯ijt, the other is to accept
an outside option with a constant reward B. Once the worker chooses the outside
option, she does not change because there is no new information about occupation
j, and the outside option is always the best choice thereafter. The Gittins Index of
occupation j is defined as the B? which makes worker i indifferent between choosing
the outside option and beginning with occupation j. This problem can be represented
by the Bellman equation
R(B, x¯ijt, Tijt) = max
[ B
1− β , x¯ijt+β
∫ ∞
−∞
R(B, x¯ijt+1, Tijt+1)φ
(
xijt
∣∣ x¯ijt, σ2jTijt
Tijt+1
)
dxijt
]
,
(1.14)
where the Gittins Index ν(x¯ijt, Tijt|σ2j , β) is the value of B for which the two expres-
sions inside the square brackets are equal. Gittins Indices can be computed using
backward induction.12 As σj and β are parameters of the economy and do not change
across workers, I omit them in the Gittins Index hereafter to simplify the notation.
11There is a caveat for using this method. Gittins Indices cannot be used when changing occupa-
tions is not costless.(Banks and Sundaram, 1994).
12Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber (2011) outline computational methods for normal reward pro-
cesses in chapter 8.2 of their book.
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We can decompose the Gittins Index into two parts as seen in Equation 1.15.13
ν(x¯ijt, Tijt) = x¯ijt + σjν0(Tijt). (1.15)
The first part, x¯ijt, is the value of exploitation. It is the expected wage in occupation
j at time t, which equals the expected output in the model. A worker i exploits
occupation j in the sense that she keeps working in that occupation. The second
part, σjν0(Tijt), is the value of exploration, which is the learning component of the
Gittin Index.14 It consists of two elements: the standard deviation of the noise in the
output process σj, and the standardized Gittins Index ν0(Tijt).
15 ν0(Tijt) decreases
with occupation-specific tenure Tijt and goes to 0 when worker i keeps working in
occupation j because a new observation of output adds little to the knowledge about
the ability of an experienced worker. I will discuss more about the learning component
in Section 1.7.2.
Gittins Indices summarize the optimal choices of young workers. A worker
trades the value of exploitation with the value of learning when she chooses an occu-
pation. There are two general rules. First, if a worker has the same mean of prior
output in two occupations, she would choose the one with noisier output or shorter
tenure so that she learns more about her abilities. It implies that workers start with
risky occupations and move to safe occupations later. Second, if a worker has the
same value of learning, she would choose the occupation with a larger expected output
because such an occupation provides a higher expected wage.
13See Theorem 7.13 in Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber (2011).
14March (1991) first introduces the terminology of exploitation and exploration in the context of
organizational learning.
15The standardized Gittins Index ν0(Tijt) is the Gittins Index of which the expected wage is 0,
the standard deviation of the noise is 1.
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1.4 The Strength of a Worker’s Comparative Ad-
vantage
Guided by the model, this section explores how the strength of a worker’s
comparative advantage, which is measured by the average distance between the esti-
mated productivities in the best-matched occupation and the other two occupations,
affects her occupational choices in her early career using the NLSY79.
1.4.1 Measurement
A worker’s comparative advantage depends on her productivity in each of
the three occupations. A larger average distance between the productivity in the
best-matched occupation and the other two corresponds to a stronger comparative
advantage, indicating that workers can more easily distinguish their best-matched
occupation from the other two. Ideally, the average distance can be calculated using
the equation below,
Di = 0.5× (Ai,best − Ai,second) + 0.5× (Ai,best − Ai,third)
= Ai,best − 0.5× (Ai,second + Ai,third),
(1.16)
where Ai,best is the productivity in the best-matched occupation, and Ai,second, Ai,third
are the productivities in the other two occupations.
However, since we do not observe a worker’s productivities directly in the
data, as an alternative, I use the estimated indirect utility from a multinomial logit
regression of choosing the best-matched occupation. From the estimation, I assume
that workers have learned their comparative advantages and are working in their best-
matched occupations after ten years of working experience. At that time, the average
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occupational mobility has decreased dramatically from 17.55% at labor market entry
to 8.29%. My calibrated model also suggests that approximately 90% of workers
find their best-matched occupations after ten years of working experience. Therefore,
I use a worker’s occupation at the end of her first ten years of her career as her
best-matched one.
Worker i’s utility of working in her best-matched occupation j is
Uij = X
′
iβj + ij, j = 1, 2, 3. (1.17)
Occupation 1, 2, and 3 are blue-collar, pink-collar, and white-collar occupations. i1,
i2, and i3 are independent and identically distributed with Gumbel distributions.
Xi includes worker i’s pre-market abilities, gender, race, and parental education level.
This study uses cognitive ability, mechanical ability, and social ability to measure a
worker’s abilities, these measurements being carefully selected so that a worker’s oc-
cupational choices do not affect them. Following past studies (e.g., Neal and Johnson,
1996; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006), I use the Armed Forces Qualifications Test
score (AFQT) to measure a worker’s cognitive ability. The AFQT score is a com-
posite score of mathematical knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, and
paragraph comprehension, the four subtests in the Armed Services Vocational Apti-
tude Battery (ASVAB) measured in 1980 and 1981. I use normalized scores within
three-month age groups provided by the NLS program staff to control for age effects.16
Following Bacon (2017), I measure mechanical ability using the composite score of
three subtests in the ASVAB: mechanical comprehension, auto and shop information,
and electronic information. To be consistent with cognitive ability, I normalize me-
16Please refer to the NLSY79 website for details. https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/
nlsy79/topical-guide/education/aptitude-achievement-intelligence-scores
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chanical ability within three-month age groups to control for age effects as well.17
Social ability is measured by a worker’s sociability at age 6 and is also normalized
within three-month age groups.18 Although other measurements of social ability are
found in the literature (e.g., Borghans, Weel and Weinberg, 2014; Deming, 2017), my
primary results are robust to these various measurements, and I use this measure to
allow for a straightforward interpretation. Finally, I convert the normalized scores of
three abilities into percentile scores ranging from 0 to 1.
Table 1.5 summarizes worker characteristics by their best-matched occupa-
tions. On average, workers who excel at white-collar jobs have the highest cogni-
tive ability and social ability, while workers who are best suited for blue-collar jobs
exhibit the highest mechanical ability. Regarding gender, blue-collar jobs are male-
dominated, pink-collar jobs are female-dominated, and white-collar jobs are equally
divided between male and female workers. In addition, workers who excel at blue-
collar occupations are more likely to have fathers in the lowest education level com-
pared to the other two occupations.
A worker i’s probability of choosing occupation j as her best-matched occu-
pation is represented as
Prob[choosing occ. j] =
exp(X′iβj)
exp(X′iβ1) + exp(X
′
iβ2) + exp(X
′
iβ3)
. (1.18)
Table 1.6 reports the coefficients of the multinomial logit estimation of Equation 1.18,
where the white-collar occupation is the base choice. To better understand the effects
of a worker’s characteristics on the choice of her best-matched occupation, I also
report the average marginal effects in Table 1.7. Consistent with evidence from the
17I use ASVAB sampling weights provided by the NLSY79 to normalize mechanical ability.
18In 1985, the NLSY79 asks the respondent’s perception of how shy or outgoing they were at age
6. There are four scales: 1 extremely shy, 2 somewhat shy, 3 somewhat outgoing and 4 extremely
outgoing. I normalize social ability using sample weights in 1985.
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summary statistics in Table 1.5, young workers with lower cognitive abilities but
higher mechanical abilities are more likely to work in blue-collar occupations. On
the other hand, young workers with higher cognitive abilities but lower mechanical
abilities are more likely to work in pink-collar occupations, and workers with higher
cognitive abilities are more likely to work in white-collar occupations. In addition to
abilities, female workers are less likely to work in blue-collar occupations but more
likely to work in pink-collar occupations; however, gender does not have a significant
effect on the probability of working in white-collar occupations. Regarding parental
education, fathers’ education plays an import role in children’s occupational choices,
but mothers’ education has little effect. Workers whose fathers have lower education
levels are more likely to work in blue-collar occupation but less likely to work in
pink-collar occupations.
The predicted occupation-specific ability is
Aˆij = Uˆij = Xiβˆj, (1.19)
where βˆj are coefficients of the multinomial logit regression seen in Table 1.6. Since
the white-collar occupation is the base choice in the regression, the predicted produc-
tivity in the white-collar occupation Aˆi3 equals zero for all workers. Moreover, the
predicted productivities in the blue-collar occupation Aˆi1 and the pink-collar occu-
pation Aˆi2 are relative values to the productivity in the white-collar occupation Aˆi3.
The first two rows of Table 1.8 summarize the predicted productivities. Most work-
ers exhibit comparative advantages in either blue-collar or pink-collar occupations,
but a few workers appear best-suited for white-collar occupations. These patterns
are also seen in Figure 1.2a, which plots the distribution of workers with different
productivities. The third row of Table 1.8 reports the predicted productivity in the
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best-matched occupation. Its mean and median are higher than the mean and median
of each occupation’s productivity, suggesting that workers are sorted into occupations
with higher productivity in their early careers.
The estimated distance is represented by the following equation
Dˆi = 0.5× (Aˆi,best − Aˆi,second) + 0.5× (Aˆi,best − Aˆi,third)
= Aˆi,best − 0.5× (Aˆi,second + Aˆi,third).
(1.20)
The last row of Table 1.8 summarizes the average distances between the productivities
in the best-matched occupation and the other two occupations. The mean distance
is 1.02 with a standard deviation of 1.15. The distance measure is normalized in
later regressions to allow for the comparison of the results in the data with those in
the simulated model. Figure 1.2b plots the distribution of the normalized average
distance between productivities.
1.4.2 Effects on Occupational Shopping
This section focuses on the effects of the strength of a worker’s comparative ad-
vantage on her occupational shopping. More specifically, it analyzes how this strength
impacts the years that a worker spends in the labor market and the number of occu-
pations that she tries out before discovering her best-matched one. A worker with a
stronger comparative advantage exhibits more productivity in her best-matched oc-
cupation compared to her productivities in the other two. This worker is less likely to
choose these two occupations rather than the best-matched one when she is uncertain
about her comparative advantage. In the following analysis, a worker’s last occupa-
tion at the end of her first ten years of her career is used as her best-matched one.
We expect that there is a negative relationship between the strength and both years
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of labor market experience and the number of occupations before the best-matched
one.
High school graduates in my sample on average spend 3.08 years in the labor
market and try 1.09 occupations before moving to their best-matched one. However,
workers take different paths to their best-matched occupations, with 46.05% finding
their best-matched ones on the first try. The others on average spend 5.87 years and
take 2.04 occupations before they move to their best-matched one. Given the large
proportion of workers who do not change occupations in their early careers, I use
negative binomial regressions rather than Poisson regressions to explore the effects of
the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage on occupational shopping.19
Table 1.9 reports the results of the negative binomial regression of years that a
worker spends in the labor market before she moves to her best-matched occupation.
To account for the possibility that the effect of the strength comes from the variables
used before to predict occupation-specific productivities, I control for the variables
used in the specification in Table 1.6, specifically the three pre-market abilities, gen-
der, race, and parental education levels. I also control for the survey year when a
worker enters the labor market because the labor market condition at entry may af-
fect a worker’s career progress (Altonji, Kahn and Speer, 2015). In Table 1.9, the
coefficients are in the left column, and the average marginal effects are in the right
column. I bootstrap standard errors of both the coefficients in the left column and the
average marginal effects in the right. This estimation suggests that the strength of a
worker’s comparative advantage has a negative and significant effect on the number
of years that she spends in the labor market finding her best-matched occupation. On
average, a standard deviation decrease in the strength costs a worker additional 1.09
19Various tests, such as the Lagrangian multiplier test and the likelihood ratio test, suggest that
there is an over-dispersion problem in Poisson regressions.
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years to find her best-matched one.20 However, a worker’s pre-market abilities do not
have significant effects on her time spent in the labor market to find her best-matched
occupation, suggesting that the effect of a worker’s strength of her comparative ad-
vantage comes from the distribution of a worker’s productivities across occupations,
not from the levels of a worker’s innate abilities.
Table 1.10, which includes the same control variables in Table 1.9, reports the
results of the negative binomial regression of the number of occupations a worker
tries before moving to her best-matched one. Similar to the results in the preceding
estimation, the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage has a negative and
significant effect on the number of occupations that she explores. On average, a
standard deviation decrease in the strength increases the number of occupations by
0.32. In addition, a worker’s pre-market abilities also do not have significant effects,
further suggesting that levels of abilities are not the driving force for the occupational
shopping of young workers.
1.5 Model Calibration
This section describes the approach used here to calibrate the parameters of the
model, specifically the monthly discount factor β, the number of months of learning
before starting work α, the standard deviations of noises in the output processes of the
three occupations (σ1, σ2, σ3), and the distributions of workers’ productivities in the
three occupations, characterized by the distribution means (k1, k2, k3) and standard
deviations (θ1, θ2, θ3). After calibrating the parameters, we can generate simulated
data from the model.
20The measurement of the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage is standardized to a mean
of zero and a stand deviation of one. A one standard deviation decrease is equivalent to a decrease
of one unit in the strength in this estimation and the next one.
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First, the monthly discount factor β is set to 0.997, which is equivalent to
an annual interest rate of 3.67%. Then, the remaining parameters are calibrated by
simultaneously matching moments in the simulated data to targeted moments in the
NLSY79. Although the simulated moments are affected by all parameters, I highlight
the close relationship between some of them and their corresponding moments. First,
the number of months of learning before starting work α, which measures the amount
of workers’ knowledge about their types (productivities) before they enter the labor
market, is closely related to the proportion of workers who change occupations in
the first year. Workers who know their types well at entry are not likely to revise
their beliefs about their productivity in their current occupation to the extent that
they change occupations in the first year. Second, according to the model, the wage
growth of a worker who stays in one occupation is driven by the new information
about her productivity revealed in the output process. The noise in the output pro-
cess determines the amount of information that a worker learns about her type. Thus,
the standard deviations of changes in log wages in the three occupations for workers
not changing occupations in the first or second year are used to calibrate the stan-
dard deviations of three noises (σ1, σ2, σ3). The remaining parameters (k1, k2, k3) and
(θ1, θ2, θ3), which describe the distributions of productivities in the three occupations,
are calibrated by targeting the medians and standard deviations of the log wages in
as well as the employment shares of these occupations in the first two years.
A worker’s occupation-specific productivity is the underlying parameter that
governs the mean of her previous output x¯ijt, which partially determines her wage and
her Gittins Index. Therefore, the distributions of log wages in the three occupations
are closely associated with the distributions of productivities. Also, since workers in
the model choose their occupations by comparing the Gittins Indices of the three oc-
cupations, the employment shares are also highly correlated with occupation-specific
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productivities too. Only the moments in the first two years are used here to calibrate
the model rather than a longer period because these early moments are less affected
by factors other than learning. In addition, using these moments helps reduce the
computational expense of the calibration by simulating shorter career paths.
To obtain the parameters, I minimize the mean of the squared percentage
deviations of the simulated moments from the targeted moments in the data. As
Table 1.12a, which displays these moments and their values in both the data and
the calibrated model, shows, the mean of squared percentage deviations is 0.000639,
suggesting that the simulated moments are close to their corresponding moments in
the data.
Table 1.12b summarizes the parameters of the model along with their values.
The calibrated number of months of learning before starting work α is 7.66, a value
equivalent to 23 months of working experience during which a worker spends equal
time in the three occupations. The amount of prior information is consistent with that
found by Gorry, Gorry and Trachter (2019) in their results. Their calibrated number
of months is 11.49, which is also equivalent to 23 months of working experience, for
a model with only two occupations. The calibrated standard deviations of noises
in the blue-collar, pink-collar and white-collar occupations are 5.49, 5.35 and 3.69
respectively, suggesting that the white-collar occupation is safer than blue-collar and
pink-collar occupations in terms of the fluctuations in the output process. The last
set of parameters include the means and standard deviations of worker productivity
in the three occupations. The calibrated means in blue-collar, pink-collar, and white-
collar occupations are 8.56, 9.32 and 4.48, respectively, with standard deviations of
3.42, 2.19 and 3.41. The calibrated means of the productivities suggest that high
school graduates on average have higher productivities in blue-collar and pink-collar
occupations than in white-collar occupations.
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1.6 Baseline Results
This section presents results from the simulated model, beginning with the
patterns of occupational shopping in the simulated model and their comparison with
patterns in the data. Second, the effects of the strength of a worker’s comparative
advantage on her path to her best-matched occupation is analyzed and compared
with the effects in the data.
1.6.1 Occupational Shopping
On average each year, 9.69% of the workers in the simulated model change
occupations, while 11.95% of the workers in the data do. Figure 1.4 compares oc-
cupational mobility in the simulated model with that in the data. Consistent with
the data, the simulated model generates declining mobility as workers become expe-
rienced. In the first year after entering the labor market, 17.4% of workers in the
simulated model change occupations. After ten years of working experience, only
5% of workers change occupations in a year. Although the calibration only targets
occupational mobility in the first year, the simulated mobility in the first four years
fits the data pretty well. However, in later years, the simulated occupational mobility
declines more rapidly than the mobility in the data. Occupational changes resulted
from other reasons, including human capital accumulation and family considerations,
potentially explaining why the occupational mobility in the data dose not decrease
as quickly as that in the simulated model.
The simulated model also generates conditional return mobility. Approxi-
mately 55% of workers return to their previous occupations in the next three years.
Table 1.13 reports the proportion of workers in the simulated model who return in
the next few years if they change occupations in a particular year. Consistent with
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the data, workers in the simulated model also have a lower probability of returning to
their previous occupations after they work in other occupations for a more extended
period.
In addition, the simulated model generates a similar occupational transition
matrix to the data. Table 1.14 compares the two matrices. Each cell reports the
proportion of workers who are in occupation j (row) in the current year and then
move to occupation j′ (column) in the next year. Workers in both the data and
the simulated model are more likely to change from white-collar occupations to blue-
collar or pink-collar occupations rather than the reverse. This result suggests that
the stepping-stone mechanism proposed by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) is not the
primary one for explaining the occupational mobility discussed in this paper.21 In
addition to the asymmetry of off-diagonal elements, both transition matrices have
similar on-diagonal elements, suggesting that the proportion of workers not changing
occupations in a year from the simulated model is similar to the data.
Moreover, in the simulated model, 89.80% of workers are in their best-matched
occupations after ten working years. For each worker, the best-matched occupation
is the one with the highest productivity. The simulated result suggests that most of
the workers have ascertained their comparative advantages by that time. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the last occupation at the end of the first ten years of a
worker’s career is her best-matched one as suggested in Section 1.4.
21In general, blue-collar and pink-collar occupations are stepping stones for white-collar ones. If
the step-stone mechanism is the primary driving force, we should observe a higher probability of
changing from blue-collar or pink-collar occupations to white-collar occupations than the probability
of changing from the reverse order. This pattern is not found either in the data or in the simulated
model.McCall (1990) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) do not find much evidence of step-stone
mechanism at one-digit occupational level either.
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1.6.2 The Effects of the Strength of a Worker’s Comparative
Advantage
This section discusses how the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage
affects her path to her best-matched occupation using the simulated data. An advan-
tage of the simulated data is the explicit measure of a worker’s productivities in the
three occupations, meaning we can observe the strength of a worker’s comparative
advantage directly in the simulated model.
Figure 1.5 compares workers’ paths for finding their best-matched occupations
in the data with paths in the simulated model. To be consistent with the data, the
plots from the simulated model also use the last occupation at the end of the first ten
years of a worker’s career as her best-matched one. The simulated model replicates a
large percentage of workers from the data who do not change occupations in their early
careers. More specifically, 61.75% of the workers in the simulated model find their
best-matched occupations on their first tries, as do 46.05% of the workers in the data.
Such workers are omitted in Figure 1.5 to highlight the rest of the distributions. The
top panel of Figure 1.5 reports the distributions of the number of years that workers
spend in the labor market before they move to their best-matched occupations in
both the data and the simulated model. On average, workers in the simulated model
spend 2.017 years in the labor market, while workers in the data spend 3.094 years.
In addition, the distributions in both the simulated model and the data are U-shaped.
The bottom panel reports the distributions of the number of occupations that workers
try before moving to their best-matched ones. On average, workers in the simulated
model try 0.968 occupations before the best-matched one, while workers in the data
try 1.097 occupations. Fewer workers in both the simulated model and the data try
more occupations before they find their best-matched ones. However, only a small
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proportion of workers in the simulated model only change occupations once. Given
that career paths are not directly targeted in the calibration, in general the simulated
model generates distributions fairly consistent with the data.
Next, I study how the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage affects
her process of finding the best-matched occupations analogous to the analysis in Sec-
tion 1.4. As we observe occupation-specific productivities, the strength of a worker’s
comparative advantage is measured using the productivities directly, which is
Di,simu = 0.5× [(Ai,last − Ai,other1) + (Ai,last − Ai,other2)]. (1.21)
Ai,last is a worker’s last occupation’s productivity at the end of her first ten years of
her career, and Ai,other1 and Ai,other2 are productivities in the other two occupations.
Based on the procedure detailed in Section 1.4, Di,simu is standardized to a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one to enable the comparison with results from the
data. The negative binomial regressions for the simulated data also control produc-
tivities in the three occupations. Table 1.15 compares the average marginal effects
in both the data and the simulated model. The results from the simulated model
confirm the negative relationship between the strength of a worker’s comparative ad-
vantage and both the number of years that she spends in the labor market and the
number of occupations that she tries before the best-matched one. Moreover, the
average marginal effects from the simulated model are larger than the effects from
the data because the simulated model concentrates on the learning mechanism while
workers in the NLSY79 have other reasons for occupational changes.
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1.7 Experiments
The previous section shows that the calibrated model is able to quantitatively
replicate primary patterns of occupational shopping in the NLSY79. This section
uses the simulated model, quantifying the importance of the strength of a worker’s
comparative advantage on her occupational shopping and the value of learning.
1.7.1 The Importance of the Strength of a Worker’s Com-
parative Advantage
In this section, I quantify the importance of the strength of a worker’s com-
parative advantage on her occupational shopping by adjusting the strength of her
comparative advantage in the model. In the following experiment, the strength of
all workers’ comparative advantages is increased by one standard deviation, which is
equal to 2.57. The increase is approximately 75% of the difference in the strength
between the third quartile and the first quartile. As the strength is measured by the
average distance between the productivities in the best-matched occupation and the
other two occupations in Equation 1.21, I enlarge the strength by increasing workers’
productivities in their best-matched occupations by one standard deviation of the
strength.22
Figure 1.6 reports the occupational mobility in the simulated model and in
the counterfactual experiment. A standard deviation increase in the strength sub-
stantially reduces the occupational shopping. In the first year, the number of workers
in the experiment who change occupations is reduced to one third of the number in
the simulated model. After five years in the labor market, fewer than one percent
22Since only the distance matters when workers learn about their types and make occupational
choices, the mobility generated by the experiment would be the same if I decrease the productivities
in occupations other than the best-matched one by one standard deviation of the strength.
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of workers change occupations each year. On average, increasing the strength by
one standard deviation reduces occupational changes by 82% in the first ten years of
workers’ careers.
Figure 1.7 divides workers into two groups based on the relative strength of
their comparative advantages. Panel 1.7a compares the occupational mobility of
workers whose strength of their comparative advantages is higher than the median
from the simulated model with the counterfactual experiment. Panel 1.7b reports
the occupational mobility of workers whose strength is weaker than the median. As
the strength of all workers’ comparative advantages is increased by one standard
deviation, their ranks are the same in the simulated model and in the counterfactual
experiment. Despite of the difference in the comparative advantages in the simulated
model, the experiment shows similar effects on the reduction in occupational changes
for all workers.
1.7.2 Workers’ Value of Learning Their Comparative Advan-
tages
Based on Section 1.3.5, I use the difference between the present value of ex-
pected lifetime wages in an alternative occupation and a worker’s choice of occupa-
tions in the simulated model to measure the worker’s value of learning her comparative
advantage (type). The alternative occupation is an occupation which offers a constant
reward B? equal to the worker’s Gittins Index of her choice ν(x¯ijt, Tijt) in each period.
According to the definition of Gittins Indices, the worker is indifferent between the
alternative occupation and her choice of occupations in the simulated model if she
has the option of learning. Therefore, the difference between the expected lifetime
earnings in the two occupations provides a measurement of the value of learning,
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which is represented as
η(x¯ijt, Tijt) =
B?
1− β −
E(wijt)
1− β
=
ν(x¯ijt, Tijt)
1− β −
E(wijt)
1− β
=
x¯ijt + σjν0(Tijt)
1− β −
x¯ijt
1− β
=
σjν0(Tijt)
1− β .
(1.22)
From this equation, a worker’s expected wage E(wijt) is equal to x¯ijt according to
her belief of her output in the next period, which is defined by Equation 1.12. In
addition, ν0(Tijt) is the standard Gittins Index defined in Section 1.3.5. It is worth
noting that the numerator in Equation 1.22 is her learning component in the Gittins
Index discussed by Gittins and Wang (1992).
To better understand the value of learning, I calculate the mean value of
learning in terms of the mean expected lifetime wages, which is
η% =
∑
i σjν0(Tijt)/(1− β)
N
/
∑
i(x¯ijt)/(1− β)
N
=
∑
i σjν0(Tijt)∑
i x¯ijt
(1.23)
where N is the total number of workers, and j is the occupational choice for worker i
in time period t. Figure 1.8 reports the relative mean value of learning (η%) during
workers’ early careers. The value of learning decreases at a declining rate. For an
average worker, the value of learning is 28% of her lifetime income. Given that the
monthly discount rate is set to 0.997, the value of learning is equivalent to 93 months of
the current expected wage for an average worker. After 10 years of working experience,
90% of workers in the simulated model are in their best-matched occupations, and
the value learning decreases to 0.041% of an average worker’s lifetime income, which
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is equivalent to 13.6 months of the current expected wage.
1.8 Conclusion
Both empirical results and the simulated model find that the strength of a
worker’s comparative advantage is an important factor explaining the occupational
shopping of young workers. To measure the strength, this study uses the average
distance between the productivities in the best-matched occupation and the other
two occupations. Both in the data and the simulated model, workers with weaker
comparative advantages are more likely to change occupations. These workers also
spend more time in the labor market and try more occupations before finding their
best-matched ones.
In addition, the model suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in the
strength of workers’ comparative advantages leads to a reduction of more than 80% of
the simulated occupational transitions in the first ten years. Moreover, for an average
labor market entrant, the value of learning is approximately 28% of the present value
of her expected lifetime earning.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Sample Construction
Criteria
Remaining
Individuals Annual Obs.
Cross sectional sample, between 1979–1994 6,111 91,073
Have a high school diploma or GED as the highest degree 2,974 43,887
Get a high school diploma or GED between ages 17–19 2,580 38,006
Get a high school diploma or GED in 1978 or later 1,822 27,053
Never work in the military 1,819 23,298
Valid CPS jobs 1,787 19,211
Start to work consec. for 2 years within 24 months after grad. 1,315 15,288
CPS jobs in the first 10 years 1,315 12,531
Have at least 7 jobs 1,151 11,770
Notes:
1 GED represents General Education Development certification.
2 This paper focuses on annual job observations in the first ten years of careers. Annual job observations
are the current or most recent jobs as of the interview date. The NSLY79 defines them as CPS jobs.
3 A valid annual job observation requires an hourly wage between one and one thousand real dollars in
2014 value and information about its occupation.
4 The final sample contains 1,151 individuals and 11,770 annual job observations.
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Table 1.2: Three Broad Occupations
Three Broad Occ. One-digit Occupations 1970 Occ. Codes
White collar Professional, technical workers, and kindred workers 001− 195
White collar Mangers and administrators, except farm-related
workers
201− 254
Pink collar Sales workers 260− 285
Pink collar Clerical and unskilled workers 301− 395
Pink collar Service workers, except private household 901− 965
Pink collar Private household workers 980− 984
Blue collar Craftsmen and kindred workers 401− 579
Blue collar Operatives, except transport 601− 695
Blue collar Transport equipment operatives 701− 715
Blue collar Laborers, except farm-related workers 740− 785
Blue collar Farmers and farm managers 801− 802
Blue collar Farm laborers and farm foremen 821− 824
Military Former or current members of the Armed Forces 580, 590
Note:
1 Workers who ever worked in the military are not in the final sample.
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Table 1.3: Percentage of Workers Returning to Prior Occupations
Year After Labor
Market Entry
Fraction of Workers Return in Total % of Workers
Return in 3 YearsFirst Year Second Year Third Year
1 18.32% 8.91% 7.43% 34.65%
2 22.73% 11.04% 8.44% 42.21%
3 14.73% 14.73% 7.75% 37.21%
4 14.05% 14.05% 6.61% 34.71%
5 15.11% 9.35% 8.63% 33.09%
6 18.97% 9.48% 6.03% 34.48%
7 19.82% 11.71% 5.41% 36.94%
8 13.33% 9.17% — —
9 17.02% — — —
Average 17.28% 10.90% 7.30% —
Notes:
1 The table uses a subsample of high school graduates in the NLSY79, constructed by the researcher.
2 The percentage in each cell is the percentage of workers who change occupations in the current year
and then return to the occupation within a given period.
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Table 1.4: The Distribution of Occupational Mobility
Number of
Occupational Changes
Number of
Workers
Proportion of
Workers
Mean Years of LM Experience
before the Last Occupation
0 530 46.05% 0
1 245 21.29% 4.28
2 204 17.72% 6.14
3+ 172 14.94% 7.83
Notes:
1 The sample is a subset of high school graduates in the NLSY79, constructed by the author in Table 1.1.
2 Each row reports the number and percentage of workers with given mobility in the first ten years of
their careers as well as the mean years of labor market experience before workers move to their last
occupations.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Workers’ Characteristics
Mean and Standard Deviation
Blue Pink White All
Cognitive ability 0.4225 0.4623 0.5237 0.4526
(0.2389) (0.2326) (0.225) (0.2364)
Mechanical ability 0.5925 0.4053 0.5227 0.5014
(0.2829) (0.2327) (0.2723) (0.2748)
Social ability 0.4757 0.4808 0.4984 0.4808
(0.2595) (0.2732) (0.2741) (0.2672)
Percentage
Blue Pink White All
Female 16.27% 74.83% 50.41% 46.30%
Hispanic 3.54% 6.99% 10.74% 5.95%
Black 9.91% 8.39% 6.61% 8.83%
Father’s education: less than HS 41.04% 31.24% 32.23% 35.63%
Father’s education: more than HS 16.75% 21.45% 21.49% 19.40%
Mother’s education: less than HS 33.96% 31.93% 29.75% 32.55%
Mother’s education: more than HS 11.79% 11.89% 11.57% 11.81%
Observation
Blue Pink White All
Number of workers 424 429 121 974
Percentage of workers 43.53% 44.05% 12.42% 100%
Notes:
1 The table uses a subsample of high school graduates from the NLSY79, constructed by the researcher.
The 177 workers who miss information about three abilities, gender, race, parental education level are
dropped in the table.
2 I group workers by their occupations at the end of the first ten years of careers, assuming that final
occupations are the best-matched ones.
3 Cognitive ability, mechanical ability, and social ability are pre-market abilities. I use the AFQT score to
measure cognitive ability. It is a composite score of mathematical knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, word
knowledge, and paragraph comprehension, the four subtests in the ASVAB. Vast majority of workers took
the ASVAB tests in 1980. I measure mechanical ability using three subtests in the ASVAB: mechanical
comprehension, auto and shop information, and electronic information. Social ability is measured by the
sociability at age 6, as asked in 1985. All three abilities are normalized within three-month age groups.
I convert the normalized scores of three abilities into percentile scores, which range from 0 to 1.
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Table 1.6: The Multinomial Logit Regression: Best-matched Occupations
Blue-collar Pink-collar
Cognitive Ability −2.697∗∗∗ −0.736
(0.635) (0.611)
Mechanical Ability 1.348∗∗ −0.859
(0.655) (0.647)
Social Ability −0.377 −0.141
(0.412) (0.393)
Female −1.461∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.273)
Hispanic −1.393∗∗∗ −0.597
(0.451) (0.389)
Black 0.009 −0.189
(0.454) (0.443)
Father’s education: less than HS 0.447∗ −0.207
(0.265) (0.258)
Father’s education: more than HS −0.275 0.137
(0.312) (0.295)
Mother’s education: less than HS 0.223 0.043
(0.272) (0.262)
Mother’s education: more than HS 0.248 0.099
(0.371) (0.359)
Constant 2.302∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
(0.472) (0.463)
Observation 974
Notes:
1 The table reports the coefficients of the multinomial logit regression with standard errors in the paren-
thesis.
2 The white-collar occupation is the base choice.
3 Non-black and non-Hispanic male workers whose parents are both high school graduates are omitted in
the table as they are the base group.
4 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Average Marginal Effects: Best-matched Occupations
Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar
Cognitive Ability -0.358 *** 0.1875 ** 0.1705 ***
(0.0764) (0.0779) (0.0632)
Mechanical Ability 0.3234 *** -0.3103 *** -0.013
(0.0751) (0.0797) (0.066)
Social Ability -0.0455 0.0194 0.0261
(0.0492) (0.0501) (0.0394)
Female -0.4288 *** 0.4115 *** 0.0173
(0.0382) (0.0411) (0.0307)
Hispanic -0.164 *** 0.0346 0.1293 **
(0.0587) (0.0649) (0.0649)
Black 0.0239 -0.0341 0.0102
(0.0534) (0.0567) (0.0461)
Father’s education: less than HS 0.0977 *** -0.0878 *** -0.0099
(0.0306) (0.0322) (0.0241)
Father’s education: more than HS -0.0608 0.057 0.0037
(0.0375) (0.0397) (0.0294)
Mother’s education: less than HS 0.0317 -0.0187 -0.013
(0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0248)
Mother’s education: more than HS 0.029 -0.0118 -0.0172
(0.0435) (0.0476) (0.0346)
Notes:
1 The table reports the average marginal effects of the multinomial logit regression in Table 1.6 with
bootstrapped standard errors in the parenthesis.
2 Non-black and non-Hispanic male workers whose parents are both high school graduates are omitted in
the table as they are the base group.
3 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Summary Statistics of Estimated Productivities
Mean S.D. Min 25% Median 75% Max
Productivity in blue-collar occ. 1.03 1.16 -2.75 0.11 1.07 1.98 3.54
Productivity in pink-collar occ. 1.12 0.64 -0.51 0.57 1.09 1.69 2.54
Productivity in last-observed occ. 1.39 0.87 -1.36 0.78 1.57 1.99 3.54
Average distance (raw) 1.02 1.15 -2.25 -0.01 1.45 1.87 3.27
Notes:
1 The average distance in the table is the average distance between the productivity in the best-matched
occupation and in the other two. The average distance in the table is not normalized.
2 The productivity in the white-collar occupations is zero since white-collar occupation is the base choice.
Moreover, the productivities in blue-collar and pink-collar occupations are relative abilities to the ability
in white-collar occupations.
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Table 1.9: Negative Binomial Regression: Years before Moving to the Last Occ.
Variables Coefficients Average marginal effects
Average distance -0.3507 *** -1.0933 ***
(0.0335) (0.1037)
Cognitive ability -0.1111 -0.3465
(0.2266) (0.7025)
Mechanical ability -0.3176 -0.99
(0.2402) (0.7459)
Social ability 0.1466 0.4569
(0.1552) (0.4801)
Female -0.1256 -0.3899
(0.1011) (0.3095)
Hispanic 0.1012 0.3306
(0.1784) (0.65)
Black -0.0345 -0.1052
(0.1595) (0.4654)
Father’s education: less than HS 0.1725 * 0.522 *
(0.0957) (0.291)
Father’s education: more than HS 0.2498 ** 0.7868 **
(0.1198) (0.391)
Mother’s education: less than HS -0.1216 -0.3655
(0.1003) (0.2949)
Mother’s education: more than HS 0.1148 0.3885
(0.1442) (0.5001)
Constant 1.4064 *** —
(0.1968) —
Year of entering the labor market Yes
Number of Observations 974
Log Likelihood -2089.495
θ 0.476*** (0.033)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4216.989
Notes:
1 The table reports the bootstrapped standard errors both for the coefficients and the average marginal
effects in the parenthesis.
2 On average, workers take 3.08 years to move to the last-observed occupations.
3 The base group are non-black and non-Hispanic male workers whose parents are both high school grad-
uates.
4 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
42
Table 1.10: Negative Binomial Regression: the Number of Occ. before Moving to the Last
One
Variables Coefficients Average marginal effects
Average distance -0.2598 *** -0.2856 ***
(0.0314) (0.0344)
Cognitive ability 0.003 0.0033
(0.2186) (0.2403)
Mechanical ability -0.3383 -0.3719
(0.2371) (0.2608)
Social ability 0.1866 0.2052
(0.1495) (0.1635)
Female -0.2967 *** -0.3217 ***
(0.1045) (0.1123)
Hispanic 0.0539 0.0612
(0.1626) (0.1976)
Black -0.0858 -0.0908
(0.1533) (0.1582)
Father’s education: less than HS 0.0477 0.0514
(0.0931) (0.0999)
Father’s education: more than HS 0.1227 0.1375
(0.1099) (0.1265)
Mother’s education: less than HS -0.0133 -0.0144
(0.0955) (0.1019)
Mother’s education: more than HS 0.1189 0.1372
(0.1327) (0.1594)
Constant 0.4127 ** —
(0.2001) —
Year of entering the labor market Yes
Number of Observations 974
Log Likelihood -1368.723
θ 1.995*** (0.318)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2775.446
Notes:
1 The table reports the bootstrapped standard errors both for the coefficients and the average marginal
effects in the parenthesis.
2 On average, workers experience 1.09 occupations before they move to their last-observed occupations.
3 The base group are non-black and non-Hispanic male workers whose parents are both high school grad-
uates.
4 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Moments and Parameters
(a) Summary of Moments
Moment Data Target Simulated Value
Proportion of workers changing occ. in the 1st year 0.1755 0.1742
S.D. of changes in log wages in the first
year or second year for workers who do
not change occupation in a year at
blue-collar 0.3878 0.3936
pink-collar 0.4060 0.4161
white-collar 0.2932 0.2901
Median of log wages in the first two
years at
blue-collar 2.4013 2.4104
pink-collar 2.2327 2.3398
white-collar 2.3132 2.2978
S.D. of log wages in the first two years at
blue-collar 0.4086 0.3924
pink-collar 0.3934 0.3741
white-collar 0.3494 0.3295
Employment share in the first two years
at
blue-collar 0.4205 0.4205
pink-collar 0.5226 0.5229
white-collar 0.0569 0.0566
(b) Summary of Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β∗ 0.9970 Monthly discount factor
α 7.6641 Months of learning before starting work
σ1 5.4874
S.D. of the noise in the output process in
blue-collar
σ2 5.3494 pink-collar
σ3 3.6867 white-collar
k1 8.5606
Mean of workers’ productivities in
blue-collar
k2 9.3241 pink-collar
k3 4.4801 white-collar
θ1 3.4217
S.D. of workers’ productivities in
blue-collar
θ2 2.1906 pink-collar
θ3 3.4060 white-collar
Note:
∗ I set β equal to 0.9970 before the calibration. It is equivalent to an annual interest rate of 3.67%.
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Table 1.13: Percentage of Workers Return to the Occupation That They Leave in the
Current Year
Potential
Experience
Percentage of workers return after Percentage of
workers return in
three years
one year two years three years
1 37.25% 13.05% 6.27% 56.57%
2 37.74% 12.51% 6.25% 56.50%
3 37.03% 12.73% 6.36% 56.12%
4 35.73% 11.98% 5.78% 53.49%
5 36.68% 11.96% 6.38% 55.03%
6 35.54% 11.81% 6.38% 53.73%
7 35.78% 11.54% 5.89% 53.21%
8 35.02% 11.19% — 46.27%
9 36.49% — — —
Average 36.61% 12.29% 6.20% —
Notes:
1 The percentages are based on workers who change occupations in the current year.
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Table 1.14: Occupational Transition Matrix
Data Simulated Model
Occupation Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar
Blue-collar 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.90 0.09 0.01
Pink-collar 0.08 0.88 0.04 0.07 0.92 0.02
White-collar 0.08 0.13 0.79 0.07 0.11 0.83
Note:
1 The value in each cell represents the proportion of workers who are in occupation j (row) in the current
year and then move to occupation j′ (column) in the next year.
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Table 1.15: Data v.s. Simulated Model: Average Marginal Effects of The Strength of
A Worker’s Comparative Advantage
Average Marginal Effects Data Simulated Model
Years before moving to the last occupation
-1.093*** -3.246***
(0.104) (0.041)
[3.094] [2.017]
Number of occupations before moving to the last
occupation
-0.286*** -1.295***
(0.034) (0.016)
[1.097] [0.968]
Notes:
1 The strength of a worker’s comparative advantage is measured by the average distance between produc-
tivities in the best-matched occupation and the other two. In the data, each occupation’s productivity
is predicted by a multinomial logit regression of choosing the best-matched occupation as in Table 1.6.
In the simulated model, the productivity is drawn independently from occupation-specific normal
distributions calibrated in Section 1.5. I assume that the last occupation in the first ten years of a
worker’s career is her best-matched one.
2 The average distances both in the data and in the simulated model are standardized with a mean of
zero and a variance of one. The top value in each cell represents the average effect of an increase in
the distance by one standard deviation for all workers.
3 Standard errors are in parentheses. The results for the data use bootstrapped standard errors.
4 Means of years and number of occupations before moving to the last occupation are in brackets.
5 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of Workers Who Change Occupations in a Year
Note: The figure plots the occupational mobility of 1151 high school graduates in the NLSY79,
constructed by the author. In each survey year, a worker decides whether to change her occupation
between blue-collar, pink-collar and white-collar occupations or not. On average, 11.95% of
workers change occupations in a year.
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(b) The Distribution of the Strength of Workers’ Comparative Advantage,
Measured by the Average Distance between Productivities in the Best-
matched Occupation and the Other Two (normalized)
Figure 1.2: Distributions of Estimated Productivities and the Strength of Workers’
Comparative Advantage
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Figure 1.3: Occupational Mobility and The Strength of A Worker’s Comparative
Advantage
Notes: The sample contain 974 high school graduates in the NLSY79, constructed by the author.
A worker has a weak comparative advantage if her average distance between the productivities in
the best-matched occupation and in the other two is smaller than the median distance.Otherwise,
she has a strong comparative advantage. I assume that the last occupation in the first ten years of
a worker’s career is her best-matched one. In each year, a worker who has a strong comparative
advantage is less likely to change an occupation than her peer who has a weak comparative
advantage.
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Figure 1.4: Proportion of Workers who Change Occupations in a Year
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(a) Distribution of the Number of Years That a Worker Spend in the
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Figure 1.5: Paths to the Best-matched Occupations in the Data and the Simulated
Model
Notes: The best-matched occupation is a worker’s last occupation in the first ten years of her
career. 46.05% of the workers in the data and 61.75% of the workers in the simulated model move
to their best-matched occupations on their first tries. I omit such workers in the figure to have
proper scales for the rest of the workers.
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Figure 1.6: Occupational Mobility in the Experiment of a S.D. Increase in the
Strength
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(a) Workers with Strong Comparative Advantages
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(b) Workers with Weak Comparative Advantages
Figure 1.7: Occupational Mobility of Workers with Different Strength of Their Com-
parative Advantages
Notes: A worker has a weak comparative advantage if her average distance between the
productivities in the best-matched occupation and in the other two is smaller than the median
distance. Otherwise, she has a strong comparative advantage. In the counterfactual experiment, I
enlarge the strength of workers’ comparative advantages by increasing their productivities in the
best-matched occupations by one standard deviation of the strength. The strength of a worker’s
comparative advantage is measured by the average distance between the productivities in the
best-matched occupations and the other two occupations. Enlarging the strength does not change
a worker’s rank of the strength of her comparative advantage in the population.
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Figure 1.8: The Mean of the Value of Learning by Labor Market Experience
Notes: The mean of value of learning is measured by the percentage of the mean of expected wages.
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Chapter 2
Good Personality Traits in Bad
Times: Does Conscientiousness
Mitigate the Adverse Effects of
Graduating in a Recession?
2.1 Introduction
The literature has well documented that college students who graduate in
recessions experience persistent earning losses as they face lower-quality jobs at labor
market entry. These workers gradually recover from initial shocks either by moving
to better firms or because of internal adjustments within firms. These adverse effects,
however, are unequal for college graduates, with those with higher earning potential
experience smaller and less persistent earning losses.
Conscientiousness, one of the Big Five personality traits, is an important pre-
dictor of earnings. Workers with high levels of Conscientiousness tend to be orga-
56
nized, responsible, and hardworking1. Psychologists have long used Conscientious-
ness to predict job performance and earnings. Recently, a growing body of economic
literature has begun to investigate the effects of personality traits, including Consci-
entiousness, on social-economic outcomes, finding that higher levels of this trait are
associated with higher wages, better education outcomes, and healthier lifestyles as
well as increased savings and life satisfaction.
This paper explores whether high levels of Conscientiousness help college grad-
uates mitigate income losses resulting from graduating during a recession. Figure 2.1
reports the residual log annual income after accounting for labor market conditions
at graduation, experience, year fixed effects, and race. The left panel suggests that
workers with high levels of Conscientiousness earn more than those with low levels
when they graduate in times of high unemployment. In contrast, as the right panel
shows, workers with different levels of Conscientiousness have similar annual incomes
when they graduate in times of low unemployment. This difference suggests that Con-
scientiousness may help workers to mitigate the adverse effects of graduating during
a recession on earnings.
Using the college graduates from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (the NLSY79), this study finds that high Conscientiousness helps workers grad-
uating in a recession mitigate their income losses. For example, a college graduate
with a Conscientiousness level of 75% in this sample can mitigate most of the adverse
impacts of graduating in years of a two percentage point higher unemployment rate
than the mean. In contrast, a worker whose Conscientiousness is at the 25% level
experience approximately an 8.5% loss of income per year over the first ten years of
working experience. The mitigation effects of the former result from the adjustment
1The definition of Conscientiousness used here is from APA Dictionary of Psychology retrieved
from https://dictionary.apa.org/conscientiousness at 12:24, March 01, 2020.
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of different margins of labor supply. Workers high in Conscientiousness tend to work
more weeks, are more likely to be have full-time jobs, and to work more hours in
these full-time jobs as a response to adverse labor market entry conditions.
This study also explores the mitigation effects of high cognitive ability mea-
sured by the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) as a comparison with Con-
scientiousness. Although cognitive ability is a standard predictor for earnings, in
contrast to the strong mitigation effects of Conscientiousness, high cognitive ability
does not help workers to moderate the adverse effects of graduating in recessions.
To my knowledge, this study is the first one investigating how Conscientious-
ness helps workers mitigate the persistent adverse effects on earnings if they graduate
during a recession. Moreover, the findings here enrich our understanding of the mech-
anisms behind the strong association between Conscientiousness and earnings in a
specific setting, that of graduating in a recession. It also emphasizes the importance
of early childhood intervention programs as Conscientiousness is mostly developed
in early childhood, meaning nurturing this trait at that time helps children address
adverse conditions in adulthood.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Persistent Effects of Graduating in a Recession
Graduating in a recession has long-lasting effects on workers’ labor market
outcomes. Analyzing college graduates from U.S., Canada and Norway, Altonji, Kahn
and Speer (2015); Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012); and Liu, Salvanes
and Sørensen (2016) find that college graduates experience a persistent decline in
earnings if they graduate during a recession. A one percentage point increase in the
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unemployment rate at graduation reduces log earnings by two to six percentage points
in the first year for up to ten years. These earning losses are a combination of losses
in both wages and working opportunities. Graduating during a recession reduces not
only hourly wages but also the annual weeks worked and the probability of being
employed or having full-time jobs.
The lasting reduction in the quality of jobs is an important source of persis-
tent income loss. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) argue that this reduction
accounts for at least 40% of income losses. The mismatch between majors and oc-
cupations or industries is another source for earning loss as students who graduate
during a recession are less likely to find jobs in their best-matched occupations or
industries (Altonji, Kahn and Speer, 2015; Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen, 2016). Both
the mobility to better firms and adjustment within firms are important mechanisms
for students recovering from graduating during a recession (Oreopoulos, von Wachter
and Heisz, 2012).
College graduates bear unequal losses resulted from graduating during a re-
cession. Those with lower earning potential experience larger and more persistent
incomes losses than their counterparts from the same cohort if they graduate during
a recession. In their study using colleges and majors to predict graduates’ potential
earnings, Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) find that workers with lower pre-
dicted earnings are more affected by initial labor market conditions. Altonji, Kahn
and Speer (2015) take a similar approach and group majors into different categories
by their returns. They find that workers from high-return majors are less affected by
high unemployment rates at graduation. One possible explanation for these hetero-
geneous effects is that workers with different earning potential receive job offers at
different frequencies and with different qualities.
Research also finds long-lasting effects of labor market entry conditions on
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labor market outcomes for other educational groups. For example, Hershbein (2012)
finds that high school graduates also experience wage losses if they graduate during a
recession, albeit the effect is smaller than college graduates. In addition, Oyer (2008)
finds that stock market at graduation, his measure of labor market entry conditions
for MBAs, have a lasting effect on their careers as well.
2.2.2 Personality Traits
Personality traits are important predictors for social-economic outcomes, and
the “Big Five” is the common taxonomy used in personality psychology. (See John
and Srivastava (1999) for a review of the history and measurement of the “Big Five”.)
According to the American Psychiatric Association, the Big Five personality traits
include
• Openness to Experience: The tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural,
or intellectual experience;
• Conscientiousness (vs. Lack of direction): The tendency to be organized, re-
sponsible, and hardworking;
• Extraversion: An orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the outer
world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience;
• Agreeableness: the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner;
• Neuroticism (vs. Emotional Stability): A chronic level of emotional instability
and proneness to psychological distress.2
2The initials of the Big Five, O · C · E · A · N, form an easily remembered acronym. The
definitions provided here come from the online version of APA Dictionary of Psychology, retrived
from https://dictionary.apa.org/ at 23:35, March 06, 2020.
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Of these five traits, Conscientiousness is the one most closely related to labor market
outcomes.
Psychologists have long studied the effects of personality traits on various
social-economic outcomes. Based on the meta-analysis of previous papers, Barrick
and Mount (1991) conclude that of the five personality traits, only Conscientiousness
has a consistent and positive relationship with various measures of job performance
across occupations. In further research, Barrick, Mount and Strauss (1993) find
similar results using data from sales representatives. They argue that workers high
in Conscientiousness have better job performance because they are more motivated
than others. Judge et al. (1999) extend the outcomes to job satisfaction, income,
and occupational status, finding that Conscientiousness also positively predicts these
outcomes.
Economists began conducting research about personality traits relatively late
compared to psychologists. However, in recent years, we have seen a growing liter-
ature focused on the effects of personality traits on various labor market outcomes.
For example, Borghans et al. (2008) and Almlund et al. (2011) thoroughly discuss
the interface between personality psychology and economics in their papers, both
finding that higher levels of Conscientiousness are associated with higher wages, bet-
ter education outcomes, a more healthy lifestyle as well as increased savings and life
satisfaction. In more recent research, Gensowski (2018) finds a direct effect of Consci-
entiousness and an indirect effect of Conscientiousness through education on lifetime
earnings for men with high IQ. Consistent with this indirect effect, Lundberg (2013)
finds that Conscientiousness increases the probability of college completion except for
male graduates from disadvantaged families. Uysal and Pohlmeier (2011) focus on
the effects of personality traits on worker employment status, their results indicat-
ing that a high level of Conscientiousness increases the instantaneous probability of
61
finding a job and decreases subsequent employment durations. They argue that high
Conscientiousness not only motivates workers to search for jobs but also increases the
probability of receiving offers by signaling a desirable attribute to potential employers.
Instead of studying the effects of five personality traits on one specific labor market
outcome, Prevoo and ter Weel (2015) investigate the specific effects of Conscientious-
ness on various labor market outcomes, finding that high levels of Conscientiousness
increase hourly wages, educational outcomes as well as the probability of being em-
ployed, working in skill-intensive jobs and having monthly savings. Moreover, by
investigating the lower-order structure of Conscientiousness, they suggest that the
effects of this trait are mainly driven by its three facets of reliability, decisiveness,
and impulse control.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample Construction
This study uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79), a nationally representative longitudinal survey started by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 1979. 12,686 youths between the ages of 14 and 22 were inter-
viewed initially and followed annually until 1994 and biennially thereafter. Most of
the college graduates in the NLSY79 graduated from college in the 1980s, a period
involving multiple peaks and troughs in the economy. Furthermore, the NLSY79
includes rich information on respondents’ personality traits, cognitive ability, educa-
tional outcomes, and employment history, all essential for this research.
This study focuses on college graduates. Of the 11,406 individuals who never
worked in the military, 2,014 are college graduates with valid graduation dates. Fol-
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lowing the selection criteria of the reasonable graduation date in Kahn (2010) and Al-
tonji, Kahn and Speer (2015), I restrict the sample to the 1,658 workers who graduate
between 1979–1989. Next, I restrict the sample to male college graduates, and finally,
to workers who have valid cognitive ability and personality traits as well as at least one
valid observation of the annual income in the first ten years after graduation.3 Based
on these criteria, 497 male college graduates comprise the final sample. Table 2.1
reports the process of sample construction.
As the national economy is most relevant for college graduates, I use the
annual average of the national monthly unemployment rates (hereafter referred to
as the national unemployment rates) as the indicator of labor market conditions at
graduation.4 Table 2.2 reports the size of the graduation cohorts and the national
unemployment rates in the year of graduation. The national unemployment rate
captures the recessions in the early 1980s and the subsequent recovery, indicating
substantial variations among different graduation cohorts. The unemployment rate
at graduation ranges from 5.3% to 9.7%, with a median of 7.2%. The unemployment
rates from 1981 to 1984, which are higher than the median unemployment rate at
graduation, are classified as high unemployment rates; 44.18% of workers graduated
in the years with high unemployment rates, while the remaining graduated in years
with low unemployment rates.
This study focuses on the labor market outcomes in the first ten years after
graduation because previous literature finds that adverse effects disappear after this
3The mitigation effects of Conscientiousness may be different between the genders. First, male
and female college graduates experience different losses resulted from graduating during a reces-
sion (Kondo, 2015). Second, studies have found mixed results about the gender difference in the
effects of Conscientiousness. Mueller and Plug (2006) find that Conscientiousness is more important
for female workers than male workers, while Prevoo and ter Weel (2015) do not find a significant
difference between the genders.
4The annual average of the national monthly unemployment rates was downloaded from the
website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics at https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/la at 09:27, February
19, 2020.
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time period(Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012; Altonji, Kahn and Speer, 2015;
Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen, 2016). Labor market outcomes in the year of graduation
are excluded from the analysis because not all workers graduated before the interview
but spent a large proportion of their time on the labor market in that year. Table 2.3
reports the number of workers interviewed in my sample over the first ten years after
graduation. In the first five years after graduation, approximately 490 workers were
interviewed per year. After that, the number of workers decreases as some begun to
be interviewed biennially. This change in the interview frequency explains the main
decrease in the number of workers interviewed per year.
2.3.2 Personality Traits and Cognitive Ability
Personality traits in the NLSY79 are measured by the ten-item personality
inventory of the Big Five personality traits (TIPI) in the 2014 survey. TIPI, devel-
oped by Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann Jr. (2003), asks respondents to rate themselves
in relation to the Big Five using a 7-point scale from “disagree strongly” to “agree
strongly”. The score of a personality trait is determined by averaging the rates of
the corresponding pair of opposing descriptions, ranging from 1 to 7 with a step of
0.5.5 For example, the positive description of Conscientiousness is “Dependable, self-
disciplined”, and the negative description is “Disorganized, careless”. Workers who
report they are dependable and self-disciplined, but not disorganized nor careless have
high scores of Conscientiousness. In this study, the personality traits are standardized
among all workers who have valid personality traits in the NSLY79 with the corre-
sponding custom weights.6 Table 2.4 summarizes the questions used in the NLSY79
5Before taken the average, the score of the negative description is reserved by the following
formula: 8− the respondent’s rate.
6The NLSY79 provides the custom weights through its website. https://www.nlsinfo.org/
weights/nlsy79.
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to measure the Big Five personality traits. This study focuses on the mitigation
effects of Conscientiousness and uses the other four personality traits as controls.
As personality traits are measured in the 2014 survey when workers have
already worked approximately 30 years in the labor market, there are concerns that
labor market outcomes in the first ten years and personality traits measured in the
2014 survey are both affected by labor market entry conditions. However, some
Economic studies, using longitudinal data, find that personality traits are stable over
adulthood. For example, Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) find that personality traits
are stable in adulthood over a four-year window. Further, Anger, Camehl and Peter
(2017) find that factory close only increases Openness to Experience for the average
displaced worker, but does not change other personality traits over an eight-year
window.
To assess the inter-dependency problem, this study compares the personality
traits of workers who graduated in times of high unemployment with those who grad-
uated in times of low unemployment in Table 2.5. The statistics are weighted by the
custom weights of workers who report their personality traits. The first two columns of
Table 2.5 suggest that college graduates, on average, exhibit higher scores for person-
ality traits than non-college graduates except for Agreeableness. More importantly,
the last column of Table 2.5 shows that there is no significant difference in Consci-
entiousness, Openness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness among different graduation
cohorts, suggesting that there is no direct evidence indicating that Conscientiousness
is affected by labor market entry conditions. The unweighted results can be found in
Table 17 in the Appendix. As a robustness check, I follow Heineck and Anger (2010)
and use age-adjusted personality scores to repeat the analysis in the main paper. The
results using age-adjusted personality scores, which are reported in Appendix D, are
similar to the results reported in the paper.
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Following the literature, this study uses the Armed Forces Qualifications Test
(AFQT) score in the 1981 survey to measure cognitive ability. The scores are re-
normed by the NLS staff to account for age effects.7 The AFQT scores are stan-
dardized among all workers who have valid AFQT scores in the NLSY79 with the
corresponding custom weights. Table 2.5 reports the AFQT scores for workers who
graduated in times of both high and low unemployment. The statistics are weighted
using the custom weights of workers with valid personality traits. The unweighted
statistics can be found in Table 17. Overall, college graduates have higher AFQT
scores than other workers. Moreover, the difference in AFQT scores between the two
graduation cohorts is not significant, suggesting that labor market entry conditions
do not affect the AFQT scores.
2.3.3 Outcome Variables
Log annual income, the primary labor market outcome in this study, reflects
the effects of bad labor market entry conditions on both the hourly wage and the
working status. The NLSY79 asks respondents directly for their annual income in
the previous year. This study restricts the income sample to workers who reported
annual incomes of more than 100 dollars based on 1979 values and who were not
enrolled in school on May 01 of that year. The enrollment status in the previous
year is available in the NLSY79 for years before 1994 as the NLSY79 was conducted
annually in this time period. However, there is no such information after 1994 because
the NLSY79 has been conducted biennially since then. Thus, this study, following
the method used by Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015), use the enrollment status in the
current year as the basis for the restrictions for previous annual incomes for years
7AFQT-3 is the re-normed score. Check the NLSY79 website for details.
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/topical-guide/education/
aptitude-achievement-intelligence-scores
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after 1994. For example, I use employment status on May 01, 1996, to restrict annual
income observations for 1995.
The hourly wage, another important labor market outcome in this study, mea-
sures the wage in the current or most recent job as of the interview date. This study
restricts observations to workers who have valid annual incomes. As the annual
income was reported in the following year and respondents have been interviewed bi-
ennially since 1994, this study uses the annual income in the previous year to restrict
the wage observations in the current year for years after 1994. In addition, wage
observations of less than one dollar based on 1979 values are dropped.
The remaining labor market outcomes measure different dimensions of working
status. First, annual weeks worked measures the number of weeks worked in the last
year. For this outcome, the sample is restricted to those who report annual incomes.
Second, the employment status, which measures the status in the week before the
survey week, is collapsed into two categories: 1 for employed and 0 for the other
status. The other two outcomes, full-time employment and hours worked per week
in these full-time jobs, are both constructed using the usual hours worked per week
in the current or most recent jobs. Figure 2.2 reports the weighted distribution of
weekly working hours in the first ten years after graduation for workers who were
employed in the week before the interview week. The unweighted distribution can be
found in Figure 9. Conditional on being employed, workers who graduated in times
of high unemployment are less likely to work exactly 40 hours and are more likely to
work overtime than those who graduate in times of low unemployment. Based on this
variable and the employment status, I define full-time employment as working for at
least 35 hours per week and being employed in the week before the interview week.
Table 2.6 reports the labor market outcomes in the first ten years after gradu-
ation for workers who graduate in times of both high and low unemployment. These
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statistics are weighted using the custom weights of workers who report personality
traits, while the unweighted results can be found in Table ?? in the Appendix. Ta-
ble 2.6 suggests that college graduates are at a high level of employment, regardless
of labor market entry conditions. On average, they work 49–50 weeks per year. In
addition, more than 90% of them are employed, with more than 85% full-time jobs.
Furthermore, they, on average, work more than 45 hours per week at their full-time
jobs. Table 2.6 also shows that on average workers who graduate in times of high
unemployment have significantly lower wages and work significantly more at their
full-time jobs than those graduating in good years. The comparison of the labor mar-
ket outcomes also reveals significant differences in the employment status among the
graduation cohorts. However, these differences should be taken with great caution as
they become much smaller to the point of being insignificant in the unweighted table.
Table 2.7 compares the weighted labor market outcomes at different stages of
careers, with Table 19 in the Appendix comparing the unweighted outcomes. The
top, middle, and bottom panels in Table 2.7 report the comparison of labor market
outcomes in 1–3 years, in 4–6 years and in 7–10 years after graduation. On average,
workers graduating in years of high unemployment earn lower incomes and hourly
wages during the first three years, but the losses shrink in later years.
2.4 The Mitigation Effects
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
This study follows the empirical strategy in Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015) to
explore the effects of Conscientiousness on mitigating the adverse effects of graduating
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in a recession using the following specification:
Yict = Ucβ1 + +(Uc × PEit)β2
+ Aiβ3 + (Ai × PEit)β4 + (Uc ×Ai)β5 + (Uc ×Ai × PEit)β6
+ Xitβ7 + ict,
(2.1)
where Yict represents labor market outcomes in year t for individual i from graduation
cohort c, including the log annual income, log hourly wage, annual weeks worked,
probability of being employed, probability of having full-time jobs, and hours worked
per week at full-time jobs, and Uc is the national unemployment rate of cohort c’s
graduation year, from which the mean unemployment rate at graduation (7.46) is
subtracted. Ai are five personality traits and AFQT scores, which are demeaned
as well. Subtracting means from these variables helps us interpret the main effects
of unemployment rates at graduation and the main effects of personality traits and
AFQT on various labor market outcomes in specifications with many interactions,
specifically β1 and β3, which are effects of unemployment rates at graduation and the
effects of traits when PEit = 0. PEit is individual i’s potential experience in year t,
defined as the years after graduation. This study excludes labor market outcomes in
the year of graduation in the regressions because workers did not fully commit their
time to the labor market in that year. Further, this study subtracts one from PEit
so that the PEit starts at 0. Xit are control variables, including a quadratic form
of potential experience, the cubic time trend, contemporaneous unemployment rates,
and race. The standard errors are clustered by the graduation cohort, the level of
variation underlying Uc.
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2.4.2 Marginal Effects
To better understand the mitigation effects, I compare the marginal effects of
the unemployment rates at graduation for workers with different levels of Conscien-
tiousness or AFQT. Equation 2.2, derived from Equation 2.1, represents the marginal
effects of unemployment rate at graduation on labor market outcomes for a worker
whose Conscientiousness is given and whose other personality traits and AFQT score
are at the mean levels.
MEConsict = β1 + PEit × β2 + AConsi × βCons5 + AConsi × PEit × βCons6 , (2.2)
where β1 is the effect of labor market entry conditions in the first year after graduation,
a value expected to be negative, and β2 describes how the effects of entry conditions
evolve over time. If β1 and β2 have opposite signs, then the effect of labor market
entry conditions decreases over time.
Equation 2.3 defines the mitigation effect of Conscientiousness, which is the
change in the marginal effects, MEConsict , due to the change in Conscientiousness. It
depends on two parts: βCons5 is the mitigation effect in the first year, which is expected
to have a sign opposite of β1 for most of the labor market outcomes; β
Cons
6 describes
how the mitigation effect evolves over time. If βCons5 and β
Cons
6 have opposite signs,
then the mitigation effect decreases over time.
∆MEConst = ∆A
Cons × βCons5 + ∆ACons × PEit × βCons6 . (2.3)
Similarly, the marginal effects of labor market entry conditions for a worker
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whose AFQT score is given and whose personality traits are at the mean level is
MEAFQTict = β1 + PEit × β2 + AAFQTi × βAFQT5 + AAFQT i × PEit × βAFQT6 . (2.4)
Further, the mitigation effects of AFQT on the adverse effects of graduating in a
recession is represented as
∆MEAFQTt = ∆A
AFQT × βAFQT5 + ∆AAFQT × PEit × βAFQT6 . (2.5)
2.4.3 Empirical Results
2.4.3.1 Annual Income
College graduates experience persistent income losses if they graduated in
times of high unemployment. Table 2.8 reports the adverse effects on log annual in-
comes. In Column (1), following the specification in Kahn (2010), the regression con-
trols for the AFQT. Then I gradually add personality traits, the interaction between
the traits (AFQT and five personality traits) and unemployment rates at graduation,
and the full interaction among the traits, potential experience and unemployment
rates at graduation in Column (2), Column (3) and Column (4). Column (4) reports
the result from the preferred specification defined in Equation 2.1.
The first row of Table 2.8 reports the effect of the national unemployment rate
at graduation on the log annual income in the first year after graduation. This effect
is consistent among different specifications for workers exhibiting mean traits. On
average, college graduates who graduate in a recession (two percentage points increase
from the mean of 7.46) experience nine percentage point loss in their log annual
incomes compared with those who graduate in years with a mean unemployment rate.
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The magnitude found here is between the founding in Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen
(2016) and that in Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter and
Heisz (2012).8 The second row reports the evolution of the effect of the labor market
entry condition over the first ten years after graduation. In most of the specifications,
the effects decreases to less than 1% after ten years from graduation. The persistence
of the effect on annual income is consistent with the results in Liu, Salvanes and
Sørensen (2016), Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015), and Oreopoulos, von Wachter and
Heisz (2012).
Among all personality traits, Conscientiousness is the only one that exhibits
a consistent effect on annual incomes across specifications. On average, one standard
deviation increase in Conscientiousness increases the log annual income by 13 per-
centage points in the first year after graduation; it then decreases by 1.2 percentage
points per year until it disappears after ten years. Most importantly, the coefficient
of the interaction term between Conscientiousness and the unemployment rate at
graduation is positive, suggesting that high levels of Conscientiousness mitigate the
negative effects of graduating in bad years on annual incomes. Moreover, the full
interaction term among Conscientiousness, unemployment rates at graduation, and
potential experience is negative, suggesting that the mitigation effects decreases over
time. This decreasing in the mitigation effect is consistent with the evolution of the
effect of unemployment rates at graduation on annual incomes. As the negative main
effect decreases over time, we expect the mitigation effect to decrease as well.
In addition to Conscientiousness, AFQT is the other trait that increases annual
8The difference may be due to the different samples and the different labor market shocks at
graduation in the three studies. Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen (2016) use Norwegian college gradates
who graduated between 1988–2003, Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015) use American male and female
college graduates who graduated between 1974 and 2011, and Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz
(2012) use Canadian male college graduates who graduated between 1976 and 1995. Kahn (2010)
uses a similar sample to mine. However, she does not study the effects on annual incomes.
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incomes, but it does not help workers to mitigate the negative effects of graduating in
a recession. The coefficient of the interaction term between AFQT and unemployment
rate at graduation is small and insignificant, as is the coefficient of the full interaction
term.
To better understand the evolution of these effects, Panel A and Panel B in
Figure 2.3 plot the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation on the
log annual income for workers whose Conscientiousness or AFQT is at the 25% and
75% level, with remaining traits being equal to the means. In addition, Panel C in
Figure 2.3 plots the mitigation effects of Conscientiousness or AFQT on the adverse
effects of graduating in a recession on annual incomes by comparing the marginal
effects in Panel B and Panel A. Panel C visualizes Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.5.
Panel A shows that workers who have low Conscientiousness scores and those who
have low AFQT scores are impacted by high unemployment rates at graduation.
However, both types of workers later recover from the initial adverse conditions. Panel
B tells a different story. Workers with high scores in Conscientiousness are sheltered
from the income losses resulted from the adverse labor market entry condition, while
workers with high AFQT scores experience persistent losses in their annual incomes.
Panel C suggests that high Conscientiousness significantly mitigates the effects of the
adverse labor market entry condition on annual incomes while high AFQT does not.
In summary, an increase in Conscientiousness from the 25% level to the 75% level
almost completely mitigates the adverse effect of graduating in bad years on labor
market outcomes, while the same increase in AFQT does not help workers overcome
the adverse effects.
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2.4.3.2 Hourly Wage
This part focuses on the hourly wage, first comparing the adverse effect of
graduating in a recession on log hourly wages with the literature, followed by an
analysis of whether high Conscientiousness or high AFQT scores help workers to
mitigate this adverse effect.
Similar to Table 2.8, Table 2.9 reports the results of four specifications. Grad-
uating in a recession (two percentage points increase in the unemployment rate from
the mean) reduces the log hourly wage by 12.8% in the first year, which then de-
creases by 1% per year thereafter. Ten years after graduation, the adverse effects
on log hourly wage reduces to 2.8%. The main effect is consistent with the result
in Kahn (2010), who also analyzes the college graduates in the NLSY79.9 However,
the adverse effect in this study lasts for a shorter period than the result in Kahn
(2010) but is consistent with Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2015).
Although both high scores in Conscientiousness and in AFQT significantly
increase the hourly wage, nether has a significant mitigation effect on cushioning
the adverse effects of graduating in a recession. Figure 2.4 visualizes the marginal
effects for workers whose Conscientiousness or AFQT scores are at the 25% level
or 75% level as well as the mitigation effects of both traits. Panel A and Panel B
suggest that regardless of these scores, college graduates who graduate in a recession
invariably experience wage losses. These losses decrease over time. Although none of
the mitigation effects in Panel C is significant, it is worth noting that their directions
are different. The mitigation effect of AFQT has a downward trend and becomes
negative in later years, while the mitigation effect of Conscientiousness is roughly
constant and always positive.
9Kahn (2010) focuses on the white men subsample while I also include black and Hispanic male
college graduates.
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2.4.3.3 Working Time and Employment Status
This section analyzes the remaining labor market outcomes related to working
time and employment status, beginning with the mitigation effects on annual weeks
worked. The regression results about annual weeks worked can be seen in Table 2.10.
The main effect of unemployment rates at graduation is negative but not significant,
reaching zero within four years after graduation. The main effect found here is smaller
and less persistent than the results found by Kahn (2010).
Despite the insignificant main effect of labor market entry conditions, Consci-
entiousness has not only a strong main effect and but also a significant mitigation
effect on annual weeks worked. A one standard deviation increase in Conscientious-
ness increases the number of weeks worked in a year by 0.796, an effect that lasts
up to ten years. In addition, compared with workers who graduated in years with
the mean unemployment rate, a one standard deviation increase in Conscientiousness
additionally increases the annual weeks worked by 0.42 for workers who graduate in
years when unemployment rates are one percentage point higher than the mean. This
mitigation on effect disappears after eight years. In contrast AFQT has no effects on
annual weeks worked.
Figure 2.5 repeats the analysis in Figure 2.3 for annual weeks worked. Panel
C suggests that workers who have high Conscientiousness scores may alleviate the
adverse effects of graduating in a recession on annual earnings by increasing weeks
worked.
Next, the effects on the employment status in the week before the interview
week are displayed in Table 2.11. The unemployment rate at graduation has almost
no effect on the probability of being employed. As more than 90% of college grad-
uates have jobs in my sample period, there is little room for college graduates to
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adjust their labor supply behaviors for this dimension. My result is consistent with
the insignificant results found by both Kahn (2010) and Altonji, Kahn and Speer
(2015). Regarding the mitigation effects, due to the relatively high employment rate
and the little room for adjustment, neither high Conscientiousness nor AFQT scores
significantly increase the probability of being employed. The marginal effects and
mitigation effects over time are plotted in Figure 2.6.
Although the probability of being employed may not be sensitive to labor
market entry conditions, the unemployment rate at graduation might affect the prob-
ability of having full-time jobs and hours worked per week in these full-time jobs.
Accordingly, workers with different traits may make different adjustments in these
dimensions.
The investigation here begins by looking at the probability of having full-time
jobs, with results being reported in Table 2.12. On average, workers who graduate
in a recession (a two percentage point increase from the mean level) are 4.4 per-
centage points less likely to have full-time jobs in the first year after graduation,
subsequently decreasing by one percentage point per year. Conscientiousness has a
large main effect on the probability of having full-time jobs. On average, workers high
in Conscientiousness are more likely to have full-time jobs regardless of their labor
market entry conditions. In addition, high Conscientiousness helps workers mitigate
the adverse effects on the probability of having full-time jobs as the coefficient of the
interaction term between Conscientiousness and the unemployment rate at gradua-
tion is significant and positive. This effect has a similar magnitude to the main effect
of the unemployment rate at graduation on the probability of having full-time jobs.
In contrast, high AFQT scores, on average, do not increases the probability of having
full-time jobs. In fact, high AFQT scores augment the adverse effects of graduating
in a recession.
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Figure 2.7 reports the evolution of the marginal effects for workers with dif-
ferent traits and the mitigation effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT. Both the
marginal effects and the mitigation effects disappear within five years after gradua-
tion.
Finally, this section explores the effects on the hours worked per week in
full-time jobs, the regression results being reported in Table 2.13. Graduating in a
recession increases slightly less than one hour of working time for full-time workers
in the first year, an effect that diminishes over time. This positive effect on working
hours suggests that workers attempt to work more to compensate for the lower hourly
wage and the lower probability of having full-time jobs when they graduate during
recessions.
On average, high Conscientiousness does not increase working hours in full-
time jobs as workers already work approximately 45 hours. However, if workers
graduate in a recession, those high in Conscientiousness try to increase their working
hours in their full-time jobs, a context-specific effect that increases over time. In
contrast, workers with high AFQT scores do not work more hours in full-time jobs
regardless of the labor market entry conditions. Figure 2.8 reports the marginal
effects and mitigation effects on weekly working hours in full-time jobs. Different
from other outcomes, the marginal effects are positive initially and decrease over
time, except for workers with Conscientiousness at the 75% level. Graduating in a
recession permanently increases working hours in full-time jobs for workers with high
Conscientiousness scores. In addition, as Panel C suggests, high Conscientiousness
augments the positive effects of graduating in a recession on working hours, an effect
that grows over time and, thus, is different from the mitigation effects for other labor
market outcomes.
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2.5 Conclusion
Empirical results show that high Conscientiousness helps college graduates
who graduate in a recession to fight against income losses. In addition, results in-
volving various labor market outcomes indicate that the mitigation effects on income
losses primarily result from workers’ adjustments in their labor supply. If workers
who have high Conscientiousness graduate during a recession, they tend to work
more weeks, try harder to find full-time jobs, and work more hours in these full-time
jobs to compensate for income losses. In contrast, this study does not find that high
AFQT scores mitigates the adverse effects of graduating in a recession.
78
Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Construction
Criteria Number of Individuals
Workers in the NLSY79 12686
Non-military sample 11406
Have college graduation date 2124
Graduate btw 1979–89 1658
Male workers 795
Valid cognitive ability 771
Valid personality 507
Valid annual incomes in the first ten years after graduation 498
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Table 2.2: Sample Size of College Graduates Cohorts
Year of Graduation U at Graduation U group Number of Workers
1979 5.8 Low 17
1980 7.1 Low 26
1981 7.6 High 38
1982 9.7 High 54
1983 9.6 High 52
1984 7.5 High 76
1985 7.2 Low 80
1986 7.0 Low 66
1987 6.2 Low 42
1988 5.5 Low 22
1989 5.3 Low 25
Total Number of Workers 498
Mean Unemployment Rate at Graduation 7.46
Median Unemployment Rate at Graduation 7.2
Note
1 The unemployment rate at graduation is high if it is higher than median unemployment rate at grad-
uation in the sample. Otherwise, the unemployment is low.
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Table 2.3: Sample Size in Years after Graduation
Graduation Year
Years after Graduation 1979–84 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
1 260 79 64 42 22 25 492
2 262 80 65 42 22 25 496
3 258 80 66 41 22 25 492
4 258 80 64 41 22 25 490
5 258 79 65 41 22 24 489
6 257 80 64 41 22 — 464
7 256 79 64 42 — 24 465
8 254 79 66 — 22 — 421
9 256 80 — 41 — 23 400
10 255 — 64 — 22 — 341
Note:
1 These are workers who are interviewed each year in my sample.
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Table 2.4: TIPI Questionnaire
Big Five Traits Positive Description Negative Description
Openness Open to new experiences, complex Conventional, uncreative
Conscientiousness Dependable, self-disciplined Disorganized, careless
Extraversion Extraverted, enthusiastic Reserved, quiet
Agreeableness Sympathetic, warm Critical, quarrelsome
Emotional Stability Calm, emotionally stable Anxious, easily upset
Notes:
1 In the survey, workers were asked “Here are some personality traits that may or may not apply
to you. You will hear several pairs of personality traits that are related but not exactly the same.
Using a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means ‘disagree strongly’ and 7 means ‘agree strongly’ rate how
well each pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the
other.”
2 I group the descriptions by their corresponding traits and whether it is reverse-scored. The pre-
sentation of ten questions here are different from the presentation in the survey.
3 The score of a trait is the average score of a corresponding pair of a positive description and a
negative description. The score of a negative description is reversed as 8− raw score. Final scores
range from 1 to 7 with a step 0.5. Personality traits in the paper are standardized among workers
who have valid personality traits using the corresponding custom weights.
4 Source: the attitudes and personality section in the NSLY79 2014 questionnaire. Visited on 10:41,
March 07, 2020. https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/nlsinfo.org/files/attachments/141219/
nlsy79r26mainquex103114_ATT.html
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Table 2.5: Mean Personality Traits and AFQT of Different Graduation Cohorts
High U at grad. Low U at grad. Difference
Openness 0.136 0.137 -0.001
(0.8) (0.954) [0.08]
Conscientiousness 0.058 0.073 -0.015
(0.8) (0.936) [0.079]
Extraversion 0.146 0.05 0.096
(0.828) (0.996) [0.083]
Agreeableness -0.14 -0.103 -0.037
(0.867) (0.867) [0.078]
Emotional stability 0.099 0.23 -0.131*
(0.852) (0.859) [0.077]
AFQT 0.97 0.88 0.09
(0.676) (0.682) [0.061]
Notes:
1 The unemployment at graduation is high if it is higher than the median unemployment rate
at the graduation (7.2). Otherwise, the unemployment rate is low.
2 Workers are weighted by the custom weights of respondents who have valid personality
traits. Unweighted corresponding statistics are in Table 17.
3 The standard deviations are in the parentheses. The standard errors are in the brackets.
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Table 2.6: Labor Market Outcomes of Different Gradation Cohorts
Labor market outcomes High U at graduation Low U at graduation Difference
Mean Log annual income 9.642 9.663 -0.021
(0.633) (0.606) [0.02]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.886 1.942 -0.056***
(0.502) (0.492) [0.017]
Weeks worked in a year 49.623 49.307 0.316
(6.968) (7.903) [0.244]
Proportion of employed 0.933 0.911 0.022***
— — [0.008]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.879 0.857 0.022**
— — [0.01]
Mean hours worked per week 46.144 45.656 0.488*
(Conditional on full-time jobs) (8.642) (9.351) [0.287]
Notes:
1 Standard deviations are in the parentheses, and standard errors for mean comparisons are in the brackets.
2 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
3 Statistics are weighted by the custom weights of workers who were interviewed for personality traits. See
Table ?? for unweighted comparisons.
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Table 2.7: Labor Market Outcomes of Different Gradation Cohorts across Years
Labor market outcomes High U at graduation Low U at graduation Difference
1–3 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.32 9.411 -0.091**
(0.686) (0.661) [0.039]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.634 1.801 -0.167***
(0.432) (0.475) [0.027]
Weeks worked in a year 48.514 47.761 0.753
(8.334) (9.909) [0.526]
Proportion of employed 0.896 0.88 0.016
— — [0.016]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.808 0.807 0.001
— — [0.021]
Mean hours worked per week 44.607 44.44 0.167
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (7.903) (8.303) [0.47]
4–6 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.72 9.745 -0.025
(0.503) (0.482) [0.029]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.919 1.95 -0.031
(0.474) (0.422) [0.027]
Weeks worked in a year 50.049 50.244 -0.195
(6.387) (6.011) [0.359]
Proportion of employed 0.945 0.923 0.022
— — [0.013]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.897 0.878 0.019
— — [0.017]
Mean hours worked per week 46.356 45.923 0.433
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (8.359) (9.814) [0.511]
7–10 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.834 9.849 -0.015
(0.582) (0.566) [0.032]
Mean Log hourly wage 2.057 2.109 -0.052*
(0.495) (0.537) [0.031]
Weeks worked in a year 50.162 49.998 0.164
(6.065) (6.88) [0.358]
Proportion of employed 0.951 0.932 0.019*
— — [0.012]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.919 0.89 0.029**
— — [0.015]
Mean hours worked per week 47.022 46.557 0.465
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (9.169) (9.695) [0.495]
1 Standard deviations are in the parentheses, and standard errors for mean comparisons are in the brackets.
2 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
3 Statistics are weighted by the custom weights of workers who were interviewed for personality traits.
See Table 19 for unweighted comparisons.
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Table 2.8: Log Annual Income as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Log Annual Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc −0.045 −0.045∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.015)
Uc x PE 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
AFQT 0.103∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037)
AFQT x Uc −0.007 0.017
(0.017) (0.037)
AFQT x PE 0.010∗
(0.006)
AFQT x Uc x PE −0.006
(0.007)
O −0.003 0.003 −0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030)
O x Uc 0.020 0.031
(0.028) (0.028)
O x PE 0.003
(0.004)
O x Uc x PE −0.003
(0.004)
C 0.072∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.015) (0.025)
C x Uc 0.041
∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012)
C x PE −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
C x Uc x PE −0.005
(0.003)
E 0.034 0.034 0.019
(0.029) (0.028) (0.036)
E x Uc 0.019 0.029
(0.023) (0.027)
E x PE 0.004
(0.004)
E x Uc x PE −0.003
(0.002)
A −0.025 −0.031 −0.004
(0.023) (0.020) (0.025)
A x Uc 0.004 −0.008
(0.015) (0.022)
A x PE −0.007
(0.007)
A x Uc x PE 0.003
(0.004)
N 0.015 0.009 0.006
(0.035) (0.036) (0.041)
N x Uc −0.004 0.011
(0.029) (0.022)
N x PE 0.001
(0.003)
N x Uc x PE −0.003
(0.004)
Contemp. U −0.047∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.160 0.169 0.173
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Mean log income is 9.63. 3. OCEAN represent Openness
to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Table 2.9: Log Hourly Wage as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Log Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc −0.063∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Uc x PE 0.005
∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AFQT 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
AFQT x Uc −0.014 0.003
(0.009) (0.020)
AFQT x PE 0.006
(0.004)
AFQT x Uc x PE −0.004
(0.004)
O 0.015 0.016 0.012
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
O x Uc 0.024 0.012
(0.022) (0.014)
O x PE 0.001
(0.003)
O x Uc x PE 0.003
(0.003)
C 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.026)
C x Uc 0.013 0.011
(0.012) (0.007)
C x PE −0.005
(0.005)
C x Uc x PE 0.001
(0.003)
E 0.027∗ 0.027 −0.008
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022)
E x Uc 0.011 0.012
(0.016) (0.017)
E x PE 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
E x Uc x PE −0.001
(0.001)
A −0.029 −0.034∗∗ −0.010
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
A x Uc 0.008 −0.013
(0.013) (0.016)
A x PE −0.007∗
(0.003)
A x Uc x PE 0.005
∗∗∗
(0.002)
N 0.028 0.025 −0.004
(0.024) (0.025) (0.038)
N x Uc 0.006 0.023
(0.022) (0.020)
N x PE 0.007
(0.005)
N x Uc x PE −0.004
(0.003)
Contemp. U −0.036∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 3,433 3,433 3,433 3,433
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.149 0.157 0.160
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Mean log hourly wage is 1.90. 3. OCEAN represent
Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗:
Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Table 2.10: Annual Weeks Worked as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Annual Weeks Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc −0.245 −0.269 −0.266 −0.226
(0.340) (0.327) (0.298) (0.238)
Uc x PE 0.070 0.075 0.072 0.065
∗
(0.047) (0.049) (0.050) (0.038)
AFQT 0.341 0.327 0.343 −0.359
(0.228) (0.235) (0.242) (0.389)
AFQT x Uc 0.111 0.151
(0.158) (0.310)
AFQT x PE 0.169∗∗
(0.068)
AFQT x Uc x PE −0.018
(0.056)
O −0.149 −0.140 −0.395
(0.229) (0.222) (0.290)
O x Uc −0.170 −0.172
(0.156) (0.255)
O x PE 0.061
(0.054)
O x Uc x PE −0.001
(0.042)
C 0.441∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.769∗
(0.167) (0.157) (0.419)
C x Uc 0.186
∗ 0.420∗
(0.104) (0.226)
C x PE −0.074
(0.092)
C x Uc x PE −0.052
(0.045)
E 0.107 0.099 0.300
(0.211) (0.199) (0.347)
E x Uc 0.141 0.317
(0.126) (0.206)
E x PE −0.048
(0.050)
E x Uc x PE −0.040
(0.035)
A −0.034 −0.040 0.423
(0.114) (0.105) (0.330)
A x Uc 0.107 0.207
(0.079) (0.129)
A x PE −0.109
(0.080)
A x Uc x PE −0.018
(0.025)
N 0.237 0.235 0.077
(0.270) (0.270) (0.587)
N x Uc −0.080 −0.101
(0.204) (0.536)
N x PE 0.032
(0.083)
N x Uc x PE 0.002
(0.079)
Contemp. U 0.017 0.020 0.016 0.019
(0.130) (0.127) (0.128) (0.125)
Observations 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.031
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Mean annual weeks worked are 49.42. 3. OCEAN
represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Table 2.11: Employment as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Probability of Being Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Uc x PE 0.002
∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AFQT 0.002 0.004 0.004 −0.003
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
AFQT x Uc −0.003 −0.016∗
(0.007) (0.009)
AFQT x PE 0.002
(0.002)
AFQT x Uc x PE 0.003
∗∗
(0.001)
O −0.010 −0.010 −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
O x Uc −0.007 −0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
O x PE −0.001∗
(0.001)
O x Uc x PE 0.003
∗∗∗
(0.001)
C 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
C x Uc −0.000 0.005
(0.006) (0.004)
C x PE −0.001
(0.002)
C x Uc x PE −0.001
(0.001)
E 0.004 0.005 0.024∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
E x Uc 0.012
∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
E x PE −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002)
E x Uc x PE −0.003∗∗
(0.001)
A 0.009 0.009 0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
A x Uc 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.007)
A x PE −0.002
(0.001)
A x Uc x PE 0.000
(0.001)
N −0.003 −0.003 −0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
N x Uc 0.004 0.008
(0.007) (0.009)
N x PE 0.003
(0.002)
N x Uc x PE −0.001
(0.001)
Contemp. UE −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 4,550 4,550 4,550 4,550
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.024
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Mean probability of being employed is 0.919. 3. OCEAN
represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Table 2.12: Full-time Employment as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Probability of Full-time Jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc −0.021∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Uc x PE 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
AFQT 0.005 0.004 0.005 −0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
AFQT x Uc 0.003 −0.013∗
(0.005) (0.007)
AFQT x PE 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
AFQT x Uc x PE 0.004
∗∗∗
(0.001)
O −0.016 −0.015 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
O x Uc −0.000 0.003
(0.010) (0.013)
O x PE −0.004∗∗
(0.002)
O x Uc x PE −0.001
(0.001)
C 0.024∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
C x Uc 0.009 0.024
∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004)
C x PE −0.004∗
(0.003)
C x Uc x PE −0.003∗∗
(0.001)
E 0.002 0.002 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
E x Uc 0.009 0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
E x PE −0.003
(0.002)
E x Uc x PE −0.002
(0.002)
A 0.002 0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
A x Uc 0.001 −0.000
(0.004) (0.008)
A x PE −0.001
(0.002)
A x Uc x PE 0.000
(0.001)
N 0.009 0.008 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
N x Uc 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.013)
N x PE 0.001
(0.003)
N x Uc x PE 0.000
(0.002)
Contemp. U −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 4,550 4,550 4,550 4,550
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.033
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Mean probability of having full-time jobs is 0.866. 3.
OCEAN represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Table 2.13: Hours Worked per Week as a Function of Entry Conditions and Traits
Hours Worked Per Week for Full-time jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uc 0.525
∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗ 0.476∗∗
(0.186) (0.201) (0.215) (0.222)
Uc x PE −0.048 −0.051 −0.044 −0.031
(0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
AFQT −0.239 −0.104 −0.068 −0.232
(0.532) (0.453) (0.457) (0.412)
AFQT x Uc 0.045 0.277
(0.162) (0.375)
AFQT x PE 0.038
(0.079)
AFQT x Uc x PE −0.057
(0.087)
O 0.306 0.385∗∗ 0.371
(0.213) (0.177) (0.282)
O x Uc 0.296
∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗
(0.098) (0.175)
O x PE 0.003
(0.057)
O x Uc x PE −0.021
(0.044)
C 0.122 0.251 0.063
(0.353) (0.281) (0.268)
C x Uc 0.492
∗∗ −0.035
(0.232) (0.162)
C x PE 0.033
(0.081)
C x Uc x PE 0.121
∗∗∗
(0.045)
E 0.284 0.229 0.650∗
(0.346) (0.324) (0.365)
E x Uc −0.207∗ −0.115
(0.112) (0.228)
E x PE −0.098∗∗
(0.048)
E x Uc x PE −0.018
(0.036)
A −0.251 −0.308 −0.222
(0.361) (0.324) (0.251)
A x Uc 0.068 −0.015
(0.285) (0.275)
A x PE −0.023
(0.067)
A x Uc x PE 0.019
(0.035)
N −0.361 −0.390 −0.587
(0.551) (0.542) (0.567)
N x Uc −0.398∗∗ 0.258
(0.165) (0.273)
N x PE 0.056
(0.077)
N x Uc x PE −0.152∗∗
(0.074)
Contemp. U −0.223∗ −0.224∗ −0.229∗ −0.217∗
(0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120)
Observations 3,942 3,942 3,942 3,942
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.033
1. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 2. Full-time workers work 45.68 hours per week on average.
3. OCEAN represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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Figure 2.1: Residual Log Annual Income
Notes:
1 The figure plots residual log annual incomes after controlling for labor market conditions
at graduation, quadratic potential experience, year fixed effects and race. I use the annual
national unemployment rate at graduation to measure labor market conditions at graduation.
2 The figure is based on income observations which are larger than 100 dollars in 1979 value.
In addition, I exclude workers who are enrolled on May 01 of the same year.
3 The unemployment rate at graduation is high if the rate is higher than median unemployment
rate at graduation. Otherwise the unemployment rate is low.
4 The Conscientiousness score is high if it is higher than the median Conscientiousness score.
Otherwise, the Conscientiousness score is low.
3 The means are unweighted.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Weekly Working Hours
Notes:
1 The unemployment at graduation is high if it is higher than the median unemployment rate
at the graduation (7.2). Otherwise, the unemployment rate is low.
2 The figure includes observations of weekly working hours in 1–10 years after graduation.
3 The distribution is weighted by the custom weights of workers who were interviewed for
personality traits. Figure 9 in the appendix plots the unweighted distribution of hours worked
per week.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
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Figure 2.3: Mitigation Effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on Log Annual Income
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
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Figure 2.4: Mitigation Effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on Log Hourly Wage
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
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Figure 2.5: Mitigation Effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on Annual Weeks Worked
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−0.030
−0.015
0.000
0.015
0.030
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Potential Experience
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
Trait l AFQT Conscientiousness
Figure 2.6: Mitigation Effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on the Probability of Being Employed
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
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Figure 2.7: Mitigation Effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on the Probability of Having Full-time Jobs
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Panel B: Trait at 75% level
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Panel C: Difference between Traits at 75% level and
at 25% level
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Figure 2.8: Mitigation effects of Conscientiousness and AFQT on hours worked per week for full-time workers
Notes: 1. Panel A plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at
the 25% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 2. Panel B plots the marginal effects of the unemployment rate at graduation for a
worker whose Conscientiousness (AFQT) is at the 75% level and other traits are at the mean levels. 3. Panel C compares the difference
between Panel B and Panel A. 4. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.
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Appendix A Modifications of Occupational Codes
This appendix summarizes the changes due to the modification of occupa-
tional codes in Chapter 1. As what I describe in the main paper, I follow Guvenen
et al. (2020)’s strategy and assign the occupation that is most often observed in a job
spell to that job. Table 14 lists ten three-digit occupations where most of the mod-
ifications occur. Among them, managers and administrators (n.e.c.) has the most
modifications.
Table 14: Ten Three-digit Occupations with Most Modifications
Occupation Code 1970 Original Occ. Modified Occ.
Code Title Broad Occ. Observation Blue Pink White
245 Managers and administrators, n.e.c. White 143 76 67 —
280 Salesmen and sales clerks, n.e.c. Pink 52 21 — 31
381 Stock clerks and storekeepers Pink 51 35 — 16
762 Stockhandlers Blue 51 — 37 14
374 Shipping and receiving clerks Pink 42 33 — 9
231 Sales managers and department heads,
retail trade
White 36 6 30 —
220 Office managers, n.e.c. White 30 2 28 —
001 Accountants White 23 1 22 —
903 Janitors and sextons Pink 23 21 — 2
202 Bank officers and financial managers White 21 — 21 —
Note:
1 n.e.c. represents “not elsewhere classified”.
Table 15 compares the number of observations in three broad occupations
before and after the modification. There are 2% percentage points fewer of annual
job observations in white-collar occupations after the modification. Young workers
tend to misreport their occupations as white-collar occupations.
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Table 15: Annual Job Observations by Three Broad Occupations before and after the Mod-
ification
Occupation
Before modification After modification
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Blue-collar 5002 0.425 5119 0.435
Pink-collar 5344 0.454 5474 0.465
White-collar 1424 0.121 1177 0.100
Note:
1 1049 annual job observations change occupations after the correction.
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Appendix B The Effects of the Distance between
Occupation-specific Productivities on
the Return Mobility
This appendix discusses how the distance between a worker’s estimated pro-
ductivities in the occupation which she left (“home” occupation) and the one which
she will move to (“destination” occupation) affects her probability of returning to
the “home” occupation. The measurement of the distance here is different from the
measurement for the strength of a worker’s comparative advantage in the main pa-
per. Although both of them measure a worker’s productivity distribution, the former
one depends on the pair of occupations involved in a change, while the latter one is
constant over time for a worker.
The effects of the distance on a worker’s probability of returning provide ad-
ditional evidence on how the productivity distribution interacts with the learning
process. A worker who moves to a worse occupation, which she thought was bet-
ter, is more likely to learn that the “home” occupation is better after observing her
output in other occupations. Therefore, she is more likely to return to the “home” oc-
cupation. A negative distance here means that her productivity in the “destination”
occupation is lower than the “home” occupation, while a positive distance means that
her productivity in the “destination” occupation is higher than the “home” one.
Table 16 reports the distance between estimated productivities in the “home”
occupation and the “destination” occupation by whether a worker returns or not
in three years after her occupational change. Each observation in the table starts
with a worker’s occupational change and follows her career in the next three years
since the change. I restrict changes in the first seven years of a worker’s career so
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that I can observe whether she returns in the next three years or not, as my sample
only has job observations in the first ten years of her career. Consistent with the
return mobility by potential experience in Table 1.3, there are 36.79% of switches
where workers return to “home” occupations in the next three years. On average,
in observations where workers return in the next three years, they have significantly
lower productivities in the “destination” occupations than in the “home” occupations.
In contrast, in observations where workers do not return in the next three years, they
have significantly higher productivities in the “destination” occupations than in the
“home” occupations.
Table 16: Distance between the Productivities in the “Home” Occupation and in the
“Destination” Occupation
Return in Three Years T Statistic
Yes No (H0 : µ1 = µ2)
Mean 0.28 -0.68 9.56***
S.D. 1.48 1.34 —
T Statistic (H0 : µ = 0) -8.87*** 4.31*** —
Number of Observations 521 302 —
Notes:
1 Each observation in the table starts with a worker’s occupational change and follows her career in
the next three years since the change. The “home” occupation is where the worker left, and the
“destination” occupation is the one which she moves to.
2 I restrict occupational changes in the first seven years of a worker’s career so that I can observe
whether she returns in the next three years or not, as my sample only has job observations in the
first ten years of her career.
3 The null hypothesis for each t test in the third row is that the group mean of the distances is equal
to zero.
4 The null hypothesis in the last column is that the means of the distances of two groups are equal.
5 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Appendix C Unweighted Summary Statistics
This appendix reports the unweighted summary statistics for the personality
traits, AFQT, and labor market outcomes discussed in Chapter 2. Most summary
statistics are similar to the weighted results.
Table 17: Mean Personality Traits and AFQT of Different Graduation Cohorts
(without Weights)
High U at grad. Low U at grad. Difference
Openness 0.169 0.199 -0.03
(0.811) (0.945) [0.08]
Conscientiousness 0.093 0.085 0.008
(0.798) (0.917) [0.078]
Extraversion 0.086 0.027 0.059
(0.831) (0.985) [0.083]
Agreeableness -0.128 -0.133 0.005
(0.862) (0.902) [0.08]
Emotional stability 0.159 0.242 -0.083
(0.839) (0.883) [0.078]
AFQT 0.803 0.731 0.072
(0.821) (0.78) [0.072]
1 The unemployment at graduation is classified as high if it is higher than the median unem-
ployment rate at the graduation of 7.2. Otherwise, the unemployment rate is classified as
low. “U” represents the unemployment rate.
2 Weighted results can be found in Table 2.5.
3 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
4 The standard deviations are in parentheses. The standard errors are in brackets.
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labeltbl:OutcomesNoWT
Table 18: Unweighted Labor Market Outcomes of Different Gradation Cohorts)
Labor market outcomes High U at graduation Low U at graduation Difference
Mean Log annual income 9.62 9.647 -0.027
(0.636) (0.618) [0.021]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.87 1.928 -0.058***
(0.49) (0.491) [0.017]
Weeks worked in a year 49.541 49.301 0.24
(7.087) (7.782) [0.244]
Proportion of employed 0.924 0.915 0.009
(0.265) (0.279) [0.008]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.872 0.862 0.01
(0.334) (0.345) [0.01]
Mean hours worked per week 45.927 45.451 0.476*
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (8.577) (9.091) [0.282]
Notes:
1 Standard deviations are in parentheses, and standard errors for mean comparisons are in brackets.
2 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
3 Weighted results ca been seen in Table 2.6.
4 The unemployment at graduation is classified as high if it is higher than the median unemployment rate
at graduation of 7.2. Otherwise, the unemployment is classified as low.
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Table 19: Unweighted Labor Market Outcomes of Different Gradation Cohorts across
Years
Labor market outcomes High U at graduation Low U at graduation Difference
1–3 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.308 9.391 -0.083**
(0.709) (0.677) [0.04]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.633 1.791 -0.158***
(0.428) (0.465) [0.027]
Weeks worked in a year 48.559 47.8 0.759
(8.283) (9.559) [0.519]
Proportion of employed 0.881 0.886 -0.005
(0.325) (0.318) [0.017]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.798 0.817 -0.019
(0.402) (0.387) [0.021]
Mean hours worked per week 44.253 43.99 0.263
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (7.858) (7.554) [0.448]
4–6 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.696 9.727 -0.031
(0.509) (0.487) [0.029]
Mean Log hourly wage 1.902 1.933 -0.031
(0.466) (0.431) [0.027]
Weeks worked in a year 49.951 50.367 -0.416
(6.403) (5.661) [0.349]
Proportion of employed 0.943 0.923 0.02
(0.232) (0.266) [0.013]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.895 0.881 0.014
(0.307) (0.325) [0.017]
Mean hours worked per week 45.959 45.864 0.095
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (8.123) (9.65) [0.505]
7–10 Years after Graduation
Mean Log annual income 9.804 9.842 -0.038
(0.574) (0.578) [0.032]
Mean Log hourly wage 2.026 2.098 -0.072**
(0.483) (0.537) [0.03]
Weeks worked in a year 49.984 49.826 0.158
(6.495) (7.279) [0.38]
Proportion of employed 0.943 0.936 0.007
(0.232) (0.245) [0.012]
Proportion of full-time jobs 0.91 0.889 0.021
(0.286) (0.314) [0.015]
Mean hours worked per week 47.018 46.473 0.545
(conditioning on full-time jobs) (9.174) (9.702) [0.494]
1 Standard deviations are in parentheses, and standard errors for mean comparisons are in brackets.
2 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
3 Weighted results can be found in Table 2.7.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Weekly Working Hours (without Weights)
Notes:
1 The unemployment at graduation is high if it is higher than the median unemployment rate
at the graduation (7.2). Otherwise, the unemployment rate is low.
2 The figure includes observations of weekly working hours in 1–10 years after graduation.
3 The distribution is unweighted. See Figure 2.2 for the weighted distribution of hours worked
per week.
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Appendix D Age-adjusted Personality Traits
This appendix discusses the results of using age-adjusted personality traits.
I follow the method in Heineck and Anger (2010) and adjust personality traits by
regressing each trait on age and age square. Then I use the residuals as the age-
adjusted personality traits. Table 20 reports the regressions used to adjust the per-
sonality traits. The worker’s age at the interview date explains less than 0.1% of
the variations of personality traits in the NLSY79. Besides, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero for regressions on Openness,
Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. To sum up, Conscientiousness is not likely to
be affected by the age when workers report their personality traits.
Table 20: Effects of Age and Age Square on Personality Traits
O C E A N
Age (Year) 0.232 0.195 0.496 −0.158 −0.336
(0.376) (0.375) (0.417) (0.364) (0.395)
Age Square / 100 −0.215 −0.176 −0.477 0.154 0.294
(0.348) (0.346) (0.385) (0.336) (0.365)
Constant −1.271 0.354 −8.417 9.226 14.688
(10.177) (10.134) (11.269) (9.834) (10.690)
Observations 6,703 6,703 6,703 6,703 6,703
R2 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0002 0.001
F Statistic (df = 2; 6700) 0.198 0.317 3.929∗∗ 0.836 3.259∗∗
Notes:
1 OCEAN represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and
Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism).
2 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
3 The age is measured on the date when personality traits were measured.
I repeat the regressions in the main paper using the age-adjusted personality
traits. The results are in Table 21. Both the main effects of entry conditions, AFQT,
and Conscientiousness and the mitigation effects of AFQT and Conscientiousness on
all labor market outcomes are pretty much the same as the effects discussed in the
main paper.
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Table 21: Effects of Unemployment Rates at Graduation and Age-adjusted Person-
ality Traits on Labor Market Outcomes
Log Log Annual Prob. Prob. Hours worked
Annual Income Hourly Wage Weeks worked Employed Full-time per week
Uc −0.046∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.223 −0.005 −0.022∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.234) (0.008) (0.008) (0.218)
Uc x PE 0.004 0.005 0.065
∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.038) (0.001) (0.002) (0.050)
AFQT 0.075∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ −0.361 −0.003 −0.013 −0.235
(0.037) (0.022) (0.389) (0.009) (0.013) (0.412)
AFQT x Uc 0.017 0.003 0.152 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗ 0.278
(0.036) (0.020) (0.310) (0.005) (0.007) (0.374)
AFQT x PE 0.010∗ 0.006 0.170∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.006) (0.004) (0.068) (0.001) (0.001) (0.079)
AFQT x Uc x PE −0.006 −0.004 −0.018 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.007) (0.004) (0.056) (0.001) (0.001) (0.086)
O −0.011 0.012 −0.413 −0.005 0.002 0.383
(0.031) (0.023) (0.301) (0.010) (0.018) (0.292)
O x Uc 0.033 0.013 −0.180 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.003 0.406∗∗
(0.029) (0.015) (0.263) (0.005) (0.013) (0.180)
O x PE 0.003 0.001 0.064 −0.002∗ −0.004∗∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.056) (0.001) (0.002) (0.059)
O x Uc x PE −0.003 0.003 −0.001 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.023
(0.004) (0.004) (0.043) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046)
C 0.134∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.789∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.026) (0.027) (0.436) (0.010) (0.017) (0.276)
C x Uc 0.067
∗∗∗ 0.012 0.432∗ 0.005 0.025∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.012) (0.007) (0.233) (0.005) (0.004) (0.167)
C x PE −0.012∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.075 −0.002 −0.005∗ 0.037
(0.004) (0.006) (0.096) (0.001) (0.003) (0.083)
C x Uc x PE −0.005∗ 0.001 −0.053 −0.001∗ −0.003∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.047) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046)
E 0.018 −0.007 0.293 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016 0.660∗
(0.036) (0.022) (0.334) (0.008) (0.016) (0.366)
E x Uc 0.028 0.012 0.321 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.103
(0.027) (0.017) (0.205) (0.006) (0.012) (0.227)
E x PE 0.004 0.008∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.104∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.048) (0.001) (0.002) (0.048)
E x Uc x PE −0.002 −0.001 −0.041 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.021
(0.002) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) (0.036)
A −0.003 −0.011 0.439 0.017 0.007 −0.239
(0.026) (0.018) (0.335) (0.015) (0.010) (0.258)
A x Uc −0.008 −0.013 0.208 0.004 −0.000 −0.022
(0.022) (0.017) (0.129) (0.007) (0.008) (0.279)
A x PE −0.007 −0.007∗ −0.113 −0.002 −0.001 −0.019
(0.007) (0.004) (0.081) (0.001) (0.002) (0.070)
A x Uc x PE 0.003 0.006
∗∗∗ −0.018 0.000 0.000 0.021
(0.004) (0.002) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.036)
N 0.007 −0.004 0.084 −0.016 0.004 −0.584
(0.042) (0.039) (0.597) (0.016) (0.014) (0.579)
N x Uc 0.010 0.022 −0.094 0.009 0.001 0.266
(0.022) (0.020) (0.546) (0.011) (0.013) (0.281)
N x PE 0.000 0.007 0.031 0.003∗ 0.001 0.051
(0.003) (0.005) (0.084) (0.002) (0.003) (0.079)
N x Uc x PE −0.003 −0.004 0.002 −0.001 0.000 −0.154∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.081) (0.001) (0.002) (0.076)
Contemp. U −0.047∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.002 −0.009 −0.218∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.125) (0.003) (0.007) (0.119)
Observations 3,730 3,433 3,730 4,550 4,550 3,942
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.160 0.031 0.024 0.033 0.033
1. Personality traits are age-adjusted. 2. The regressions also control quadratic potential experience, cubic time trend and race. 3. OCEAN
represent Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Emotional stability (opposite to Neuroticism). 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 5. Standard errors are clustered by graduation year.
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